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1.1 When Markets Fail
Markets play at least three important roles in the economy. First, they allow
for exchange. Goods and services are able to be re-allocated to those who
value them most highly. Second, markets allow for the pooling and reduction
of risk. Proper diversification can reduce the amount of risk faced by individ-
uals. Third, markets can aggregate information.
It is this third function of markets that is the study of this thesis. Through
their transaction prices, markets have the potential to aggregate diverse in-
formation and provide signals to agents about the relative, fundamental, value
of different goods and services. The task of evaluating the relative values of
the many goods produced by society can seem to be a formidable task, yet
competitive markets can (at least in theory) solve this problem, in an inad-
vertent form of crowd-sourcing. This process is referred to as price discovery.
Relatively high prices, for example, can signal that a good is very valuable to
society - agents then have an incentive to increase their supply (production) of
that good, while at the same time reduce their demand for it (as consumption
and/or as an input into production). In this way prices can provide a guide to
society about how to consume and allocate productive resources. When price
discovery has taken place, markets are said to be efficient.
The problem, however, is that there is no guarantee that market prices will
exactly aggregate all individual preferences so that relative prices correctly
1
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reflect fundamentals. In fact, there is no guarantee that they will do so even
approximately correctly. When prices differ from fundamentals there is said to
be mispricing in the market. One such pattern in which prices can deviate from
fundamentals is a bubble. As Siegel (2003) puts it, “[t]he word bubble conjures
up the image of an object growing steadily until it finally pops”. In asset
market terms, the object that is growing is prices relative to fundamentals. A
bubble is a period of persistently growing over-pricing, culminating in a sharp
drop, or crash, in prices towards fundamentals. If fundamentals are relatively
stable over this period, then prices tend to grow and grow until one day they
crash spectacularly.
These events often leave chaos in their wake. Those caught unaware by
the crash in prices experience significant losses that often lead to cascading
effects in other parts of the economy. The direct cost of a bubble is the over-
investment that results from the temporary over-pricing of the asset. The in-
direct costs of a bubble are the consequences of the typically large and rapid
redistributions of wealth that occur when prices crash at the end of the bub-
ble. These large fluctuations in wealth can lead to social disruption and have
spillover effects on the rest of the economy.
1.2 Does It Happen Often?
But how pervasive are these bubbles? Do they only occur in specific types of
markets, or during specific parts of history? Or can they potentially occur in
all types of asset markets?
Consider a recent example of such price behavior. From the mid 1990s on-
wards, U.S. housing prices grew at an abnormally rapid pace for more than
decade. Following the peak in their levels near the beginning of 2007, prices
fell rather abruptly. By late 2007, public officials were taking note and express-
ing their concern. Henry Paulson, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, opined that he
saw “[the housing decline] as the most significant current risk to our econ-
omy” (U.S. Office of the Treasury (2007)). Nevertheless, he put forward an
optimistic view, stating that “[e]ven so, I believe we have a healthy, diversi-
fied economy that will continue to grow”.
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Figure 1.1: U.S. Housing Prices, 1987 - 2009
Notes: The figure shows the Case-Schiller U.S. national housing price index for 1987Q1 to
2009Q1. Source: Standard & Poor’s.
By the end of 2008, the Case-Schiller Housing index (see Figure 1.1), a lead-
ing indicator of housing value, had decreased by 30%, returning to levels
last seen in 2002. These price movements were far different from historical
trends for the index. The previously high prices had led to over-investment
in U.S. housing, both by consumers and builders. This meant that after the
crash, the U.S. was left with a glut of excess housing supply, and millions
of American homeowners were forced to either foreclose on their mortgage
or go through costly mortgage re-financing. Financial companies with large
amounts of mortgage loans faced severe losses. For example, the five largest
U.S. investment banks at the time were either taken over (Bear Stearns and
Merrill Lynch), bailed-out (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley), or went
bankrupt (Lehman Brothers). The failure of these institutions caused panic
in other financial sectors and precipitated government intervention the world
over (see, for example, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009) and Mayer et al.
(2009)). The free-fall in housing prices became blamed by many for triggering
a worldwide global recession whose effects still linger in various economies to
this day. Two years later the U.S. “housing bubble” would be blamed in part
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for the “worst financial crisis since the Great Depression” (Reuters (2009)).
The possibility raised by this very salient example is that market prices may
become de-coupled from what is considered to be their true values, and that
this de-coupling has real negative effects on the economy that can spread be-
yond its origins.
The example also makes it clear that price bubbles are a present concern
in today’s highly-integrated world. It has, however, long been argued that
deviations of prices from values are commonplace and substantial, and that
asset prices readily become decoupled from fundamental values (see Shiller
(2003) for a review) and form market bubbles (Shiller (1981); Froot and Obst-
feld (1991)). From a theoretical point of view, booms and crashes have been
modeled both as originating from the presence of irrational trader types such
as feedback traders (see for example De Long et al. (1990)) or overconfident
traders (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)) as well as rational phenomena (Tirole
(1982); Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)). Most disconcertedly, bubbles have
been shown to arise even when the fundamental value of the asset is known
to all market participants. Camerer (1989) refers to this as a rational growing
bubble: “The hallmark of the rational growing bubble is that traders realize
prices are much higher than intrinsic values, but they buy assets anyway, ex-
pecting prices to go even higher”. Thus there appear to be few, if any, apriori
limitations on when bubbles may arise.
On the other hand, the suggestion that price bubbles and crashes are per-
vasive is unappealing to many economists because such mispricing is at odds
with classical economic and financial theory. Thus, there is an ongoing debate
about whether asset prices have a tendency to deviate from fundamentals as
a matter of course, or whether deviations from fundamentals are a rare, unbi-
ased, or rather inconsequential phenomenon (Fama (1998); Malkiel (2003)).
Table 1.1 contains a selection of some of the more well-known market episodes
which have displayed behavior consistent with a bubble1. The list goes back
to the early 1600’s, and spans the range of highly sophisticated technology
and banking sectors to basic commodities, suggesting that bubbles can occur
in all types of circumstances.
Whether or not an episode qualifies as a bubble or not is the subject of consid-
erable debate. For example, Temin and Voth (2004) have argued that during
the South Sea episode at least one major investor was aware that the market
was in a speculative bubble. On the other hand, Pástor and Veronesi (2006)
1Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) provides an exhaustive discussion of many more exam-
ples.
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Table 1.1: Ten Potential Bubbles
Episode Bubble Crash
1634-1637, Dutch tulipsa +5000% -90%
1718-1720, Mississippi bubblea +2000% -60%
1719-1720, South Sea companyb +843% -88%
1842-1849, Railway Maniac +100% -60%
1928-1932, U.S. stocksc +100% -60%
1969-1970, Australian mining companiesc +2800% -100%
1986-1991, Japanese real estate and stocksd +110% -63%
1998-2001, U.S. internet companiese +150% -78%
2004-2008, Uraniumf +650% -60%
1996-2009, U.S. real estateg +120% -40%
a Garber (2001). b Temin and Voth (2004). c Simon (2003). d Siebert (1999).
e Google, Inc. f http://www.uranium.info. g Standard & Poor’s, Inc.
find that the runup and decline in the NASDAQ index was not indicative of a
bubble. French and Poterba (1991) argue that the Japanese stock market bub-
ble of the late 1980’s cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals. Gar-
ber (2001) argues that the Dutch tulip mania, the Mississippi bubble, and the
South Sea company episodes were not bubbles. But even with caveats such as
these, it is reasonable to conclude that it is impossible to rule out the existence
of bubbles in a wide variety of markets.
1.3 How Do Bubbles Work?
The next question worth asking is whether such events can be controlled, pre-
dicted and/or prevented. In order to answer these questions, it helps to out-
line the sequence of events that underlie a bubble. Kindleberger and Aliber
(2005) use an exhaustive historical record to piece together clues about how
bubbles manifest themselves, surge, and eventually reach a tipping point that
leads to their ultimate demise.
The typical story goes something like the following. A bubble is brought
into being by some positive exogenous shock that increases the value of an
asset sharply. These shocks may be attributed to the beginning or ending of
conflicts, technological innovation, or changes in government policy. This ini-
tial shift in fundamentals has a subtle effect on investors - they bear witness
to some investors making large portfolio gains from the asset over a short
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time period. Observing these gains, more and more investors start believing
that short-term capital gains may be realized from investing in this asset, or
even that the trend in fundamentals has shifted. This sparks the flame that
eventually leads to a wildfire in positive sentiment regarding the asset, until a
white-hot mania has swept over the market.
While the mania spreads, pushing the asset’s price to ever-higher levels,
a counter-acting force gathers strength. Investors transfer more and more of
their wealth into the bubbled asset, making it harder and harder to finance
new holdings of the asset. Credit slowly dries up, making each new invest-
ment in the asset harder to make.
Eventually, there comes a point where the forces of scarce credit and ratio-
nal beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset over-power the frenzy of
short-term capital gains expectations. At this point, the brief “calm” before
the storm, the market reaches its peak. Then cool heads, who realize roughly
how over-priced the asset is, and thus how far it must eventually crash, lead a
rush to get out of the asset. So much credit is tied up in the asset that it makes
it difficult to find outside buyers who might think of reversing the trend.
The scary thing about a bubble is how quickly prices can fall at the end.
This “panic” in one asset class becomes a very noticeable, albeit by itself not
terribly important, event. The problem arises when panic about the direct
repurcussions of the crash, which can have a significant effect on the portfolios
of market participants, can have spillover effects on the rest of the economy,
so that doubt about the stability of the entire system is created.
Once things have progressed to the point of free-falling prices and dimish-
ing portfolio values, one of the few policy options is direct intervention by
some body - what Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) refer to as a lender of last re-
sort. The role of the lender of last resort is to supply money to “otherwise pre-
viously solvent and well-capitalized firms” (p. 225). The most recent global re-
cession, which included extensive government intervention to prop up or na-
tionalize failing financial institutions in several countries, shows that this line
of action is currently deemed a reasonable response to these types of crises.
There are, however, several difficulties with such an approach. The first
is determining which firms are worthy of the lenders support. Which firms
were “otherwise previously solvent and well-capitalized”? A fine line must
be drawn between firms who had or had not made reasonable investments.
Another complication is the point in time at which the lender should inter-
vene. At which point do you increase credit to soften the landing of the bubble
without running the risk of prolonging the boom phase of the cycle? Finally,
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how is credit supplied to ailing firms? Concerns about public control of pri-
vate enterprises abound in these circumstances. When the lender of last resort
chooses to become involved with private enterprises, it needs to have a co-
herent plan for both getting in and getting out of its position. The answers to
these questions of who to provide credit to, at what time, and under which
conditions is not immediately obvious.
In addition to handling the immediate crisis, another problem is the long-
term effects of “rescuing” market participants who have suffered significant
losses. The moral hazard created by such activity has the potential to worsen
future speculative episodes. As the English philosopher Herbert Spencer wrote:
“The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of folly, is to fill the
world with fools.”. The danger is that saving those who speculated today will
send a signal to investors that they will not end up bearing the entire risk of
future speculative actions, making it more likely that bubbles will re-occur.
The other option is to take pre-emptive action to limit the size of bubbles.
This includes deposit insurance and bank holidays, which are designed to
shelter banks from experiencing runs on their deposits. Another option is re-
leasing public announcements that warn of a bubble in progress. The hope
is that such announcements will trigger a milder crash to fundamentals be-
fore the bubble has had a chance to reach its naturally occurring peak level.
Other possibilities include speculation taxes (which make speculation less at-
tractive) and clearinghouse certificates (which are a type of mutual insurance
agreement between companies).
Gauging the effectiveness of these methods with a clear mind is not an easy
task. Unfortunately, as the recent global downturn demonstrates, the onset of
a crisis seems to spur the formation of all manners of opinions around the sub-
ject, opinions that may be too easily be influenced by present circumstances
rather than objective evidence.
1.4 Observability
One difficulty with analysing bubbles and policies designed to limit their oc-
currence is that even with hindsight, it is hard to establish with certainty
whether a bubble has occured or not. In order to establish that any kind of
mispricing has occured in a market, it is necessary to know prices and funda-
mentals. Prices are usually not too difficult to observe, however fundamen-
tals, even several years after the fact, may still remain unknown.
Consider the example given at the beginning of the chapter. U.S. hous-
8 INTRODUCTION
ing prices peaked sometime in 2005 after several years of abnormal increases.
This was followed by an on-going crash. Casual inspection of the price pat-
tern suggests that a bubble might have occured, given that the the market
had been operating efficiently in the 1990s and that this trend in fundamen-
tals had continued into the next decade. Note, however, that whether or not
the run-up and subsequent crash in prices was a bubble depends critically on
what was occuring to fundamentals during that time, which is very difficult
to determine.
This is the observability problem associated with trying to measure bubbles.
Tests of fundamental pricing typically involve postulating a hypothesis about
the fundamental value of an asset and measuring how well prices track fun-
damentals under the assumption that the hypothesis governing fundamentals
is correct. Fama (1970) makes the point that these tests are in fact joint tests of
price discovery and the assumptions made on the process guiding fundamen-
tals2. If efficiency is not rejected, there is some support for efficienct markets
and the particular hypothesis regarding fundamentals. If efficiency is rejected,
then this only says that if the market was actually efficient, it did not follow
the postulated pattern for fundamentals. Thus in case of a rejection, it is never
possible to know whether markets are truly inefficient, or whether fundamen-
tals were simply improperly specified.
The problem of observability is not specific to applied financial studies, but
applies more generally to much of economics. For this reason, many branches
of economics have taken to the use of experimental methods. The experi-
mental method, in brief, is to construct and repeatedly observe behavior in
a particular environment. As opposed to field studies, which consist of data
that include all manner of unobservable influences, experimental studies use
a relatively simple and “sterile” environment to focus in on the variable of
interest.
The use of laboratory experimental methods makes the fundamental value
directly observable. As with any choice of research methodology, however,
2Summers (1986) observes that many tests of the observable implications of market effi-
ciency have low power to reject the null hypothesis of no mispricing. He writes “. . . certain
types of inefficiency in market valuations are not likely to be detected using standard meth-
ods. This means the evidence found in many studies, that the hypothesis of efficiency cannot
be rejected, should not lead us to conclude that market prices represent rational assessments
of fundamental valuations. Rather, we must face the fact that most of our tests have relatively
little power against certain types of market inefficiency. In particular, the hypothesis that
market valuations include large persistent errors is as consistent with the available empirical
evidence as is the hypothesis of market efficiency.”
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the choice of the experimental method involves a tradeoff. The use of these
methods typically restricts attention to the study of markets that are small
in terms of scale, time, number of traders, and monetary stakes, and whose
trader characteristics differ from those found in typical non-laboratory mar-
kets. However, experimental methods do have the advantage that they allow
the fundamental value of an asset to be unambiguously specified, observed,
controlled, and compared to transaction prices.
Therefore in addition to learning about markets by looking at data from
stock exchanges and exchange rates, laboratory markets are also used to in-
vestigate bubble phenomena. Relatively simple markets are constructed in
which subjects are able to buy and sell units of one or more assets. Then by
varying various features of the environment, the impact of those features on
the laboratory market offers suggestive evidence about how markets in gen-
eral are affected by those features.
1.5 The Contributions of This Thesis
Market and bubble research may be approached from a multitude of angles.
The first is to study the endogenous emergence of bubbles as a function of in-
stitutional market settings - which type of market conditions are more prone
to bubble formation than others? Another line of research is to take the pres-
ence of bubbles as given, and then analyze the effect this has on other market
activities. Finally, a third way issue is examine exactly which type of individ-
ual behavior causes bubbles to be formed.
This thesis consists of three experimental studies, each of which uses one of
the approaches mentioned above to study bubble markets. To place this work
into context, Chapter 2 describes the basic design of an experimental asset
market, including the specific design used in the subsequent three chapters,
and contains a review of previous literature that use variations of the setup to
investigate experimental bubbles. The study chapters are independent of one
another and may be read in the order most preferred by the reader.
Chapter 3 finds that the time path that fundamentals follow affects market
efficiency. The notion of fundamentals affecting prices is largely accepted as
being true, but the novelty of this chapter is that it shows that turning points in
fundamentals can also affect efficiency. The chapter shows that markets per-
form more efficiently during downturns in fundamentals than they do during
upswings. The implications of this asymmetry is that policy might need to be
asymmetric as well.
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Chapter 4 studies the creation and destruction of financial shares by firms
through the use of share issues and share repurchases. The results show that
a repurchase of shares increases the price of the asset, and a share issue de-
creases the price of the asset, compared to a benchmark of no intervention.
The effects are consistent with the capital structure puzzle, a negative correla-
tion that is typically observed between the price and the supply of shares of
stock. Secondly, the empirical patterns observed are consistent with a model
proposed by De Long et al. (1990), which posits three trader types– funda-
mental, speculator, and momentum– interacting in the market. Lastly, the
downward pressure on prices resulting from share issues drives prices down
toward, but not beyond, fundamental values. This downward resistance at
the fundamental value arises from the impact of an intervention on the pro-
portion of the total stock of units and cash held by each trader type.
A pressing issue in many parts of economics is how well theoretical mod-
els describe reality. Until only recently, this was done almost exclusively by
comparing the choice predictions of the models to actual outcomes. However,
there is now a burgeoning literature on neuroeconomics that uses recent devel-
opment of physiological equipment and techniques to study the brain activ-
ity underlying choice decisions (see Camerer et al. (2005) and Glimcher et al.
(2008) for good summaries of the field). For example, several studies look at
how neural activation correlates with behavior in financial tasks (Preuschoff
et al. (2006), Preuschoff et al. (2008), Knutson and Bossaerts (2007), Hampton
et al. (2008)).
In this vein, Chapter 5 is a study of information absorption in bubble mar-
kets and how this relates to subsequent choice behavior. Using advanced eye-
tracking techniques, an experiment is conducted that tracks screen focus as
individuals trade in a market. With respect to design considerations, there is
some evidence that only certain types of dividend information affects price
discovery. In terms of explaining the eye-tracking data, information acquisi-
tion is found to be stable across a variety of socio-demographic measures. The
final piece of analysis uses the eye-tracking data to predict short-term individ-
ual and market behavior. Attention to received dividends is found to play a
prominent role both in terms of future price increases and in terms of indi-
vidual trading patterns. Market crashes are found to be preceded by a sharp
drop in attention to buying opportunities, while once crashes are underway
attention tends to return to the purchasing area of the screen.
The recent convulsions in the global economic system have shown that
there are strong concerns regarding the ability of the market system to “get
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things right”. This thesis is a small step forward towards better understand-




The following three chapters describe controlled laboratory studies of experi-
mental bubble markets. As such, this chapter serves as a primer on the topic,
including a discussion of their design parameters and previous research cov-
ering the topic. Finally, the section concludes with a summary of the common
design elements found in the ensuing chapters.
2.1 Terminology
An asset market study or experiment consists of a set of independent observa-
tions of a market setting. An observation refers to the actions of a distinct group
of subjects in an isolated market. When multiple market designs are used in
a single study, each design is referred to as a treatment of the market, and the
various treatments usually differ from one another along a single dimension.
This allows the effects of changes along that one dimension to be measured by
differences in behavior between observations from different treatments.
A session refers to a specific time period when observations are collected.
When, as is often the case with asset market experiments, a single session is
used to collect a single observation, the terms “observation” and “session”
may be used interchangeably. This is the case with the work discussed in this






Market experiments began by studying the price properties of markets for
goods that were valued differently by each market participant, and in which
subjects had different information sets regarding the fundamental value. The
use of a range of participant values for the good provided a seemingly-necessary
impetus for trade and also allowed for the study of the re-allocative efficiency
of the market1.
Chamberlin (1948) reported the first results of an asset market experiment.
Wanting to illustrate a theoretical argument to his students, Chamberlin had
them participate in a market for an artificial asset. Students began by drawing
numbered cards from a randomly stacked deck. The number was the redemp-
tion value of the good to the student. The idea was that students with low val-
ues (designated as “sellers”) would sell a unit of the good to those with high
values (“buyers”). Each student was able to participate in a single trade only,
thus the market produced a series of transaction prices until there were no
subjects left in the market who still wished to trade. The induced valuations
for the good implicitly defined market demand and supply curves, and thus
also a competitive equilibrium (unknown to the market participants) which
actual volume and transaction prices could be compared to.
The markets were generally efficient at transferring goods from sellers to
buyers, although prices did tend to be a bit too low and volume a bit too
high relative to the competitive benchmark. It was, however, the process of
seeking to explain these slight anomolies that led Chamberlin to question the
very premise of how markets might generally equilibrate. He writes (p. 102):
“My own skepticism as to why actual prices should in any literal
sense tend toward equilibrium during the course of a market has
been increased not so much by the actual data of the experiment
before us - which are certainly open to limitations - as by failure,
upon further reflection stimulated by the problem, to find any rea-
son why it should be so.”
He explains by noting that (p. 102, emphasis in original):
“. . . information during the market as to the equilibrium price would
help establish a trend in that direction, but information as to actual
1Smith et al. (1988) would later show that neither heterogeneous asset values nor different
information sets were necessary to generate substantial market exchange.
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prices may do the opposite, in so far as they are divergent from
equilibrium and are falsely interpreted to be near it.”
The point he makes in the second quotation is that prices may perpetually drift
farther and farther from the fundamental value, since fundamental values are
not known in the real world. If actual prices are not near fundamentals, but
are interpreted as so, this can lead to a reinforcing divergence of prices from
fundamentals. What he had just described, in fact, was a distinguishing fea-
ture of a bubble episode.
Market experiments had begun, and the possibility of directly observing a
bubble did not seem far-fetched. However, following Chamberlin’s musings
on the likelihood of bubble phenomena, the issue lay dormant for another 40
years while the attention of the literature remained more focussed on perfor-
mance near the competitive equilibrium. Various results were obtained re-
garding the sensitivity of market environments to different factors2 , although
no bubbles were ever observed.
2.2.2 A First Sighting
The original idea of Smith et al. (1988) (hereafter SSW) had been to determine
a set of sufficienct conditions for generating a bubble. The idea was to start
with a simple design that did not produce a bubble and then modify the en-
vironment until a bubble was observed. The authors studied a similar market
as the original Chamberlin (1948) study and other subsequent papers, with
a few key differences. First, earnings from asset holdings were paid out pe-
riodically throughout the life of market, rather than only at the end of the
market. Second, only the distribution of possible values was known to sub-
jects (a combination of draws from a four-point uniform distribution). Third,
this distribution was identical across subjects and common knowledge. This
generated a fundamental value for the asset, common to all subjects, that de-
clined linearly over time3. Finally, subjects were permitted to enter into as
2For example, rent size and trading mechanism (Smith (1964)), speculation (Miller et al.
(1977)), transaction costs (Noussair et al. (1998)), price controls (Isaac and Plott (1981)), the
presence of futures markets (Forsythe et al. (1982)), the number of assets (Plott and Sunder
(1988)), production decisions (Mestelman and Welland (1988)), market power (Isaac et al.
(1984)), hidden trading (Campbell et al. (1991)), private information (Plott and Sunder (1982)),
expectations (Williams (1987)), and experience (Forsythe et al. (1982)).
3Strictly speaking, the fundamental value is only equal for all subjects up to a risk-
adjustment factor, although given the stakes of the experiment and the repeated nature of
the dividend draws, these factors are likely of secondary importance.
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many trades as they desired (as long as cash and asset holdings were never
negative).
What they found was that their simple environment already produced bub-
bles! The pattern of price deviations they were able to consistently observe in
their markets fit exactly the description of a bubble - a sustained period of in-
creasingly higher over-pricing occured in the early and middle periods of the
market4, until finally markets crashed abrupty in the latter periods. The SSW
experiment is particularly noteworthy because they were able to consistently
reproduce the bubble phenomena that up until that point in time had never
been directly observed with certainty.
Given that they already had an environment that generated bubbles on
their hands, they then set about determining what, if anything, could elim-
inate them. They considered price controls and the type of subjects used in
the market. Markets consisting of people from the local business community
and markets using top-performing subjects from previous experiments both
produced bubbles. Price controls had little to no effect. The only procedure
that seemed to significantly reduce bubbles was when the same group of sub-
jects repeated the market environment. As a first attempt at characterizing
the process underlying a bubble, the authors also included four sessions that
included subject forecasts of future prices. They found that forecast errors
are inversely related to price changes, that is subjects tended to under-predict
expansions and over-predict contractions, but expectations also adapted over
time.
2.3 Variations
Thus an environment in which bubbles could be reliably produced had been
discovered. This spawned several other studies that increased understand-
ing of how and why bubbles occur by considering derivations of the original
setting studied by SSW.
This section presents a brief summary of that research. Some earlier sum-
maries of experimental asset markets in general are provided in Smith (1991)
and Sunder (1995). For slightly different perspectives on the findings, Bossaerts
(2001) analyzes the literature through the lens of asset pricing theory, while
Gerding (2007) discusses the implications for legal policy. Most recently, Plott
and Smith (2008) contains papers discussing a large selection of the work dis-
4A period here simply indicates the period of time before units of the asset produce divi-
dend earnings for their owners.
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cussed below.
The basic treatment for studying asset markets consists of the following.
First, all subjects of a session are endowed with units of cash and shares of one
or more assets. Subjects value assets because 1) assets generate cash earnings
for their owners, and 2) assets may be sold to other subjects. Following the
endowment of shares and cash, subjects are able to make trades involving
shares and cash in a market according to some trading mechanism, and under
certain informational constraints. This process of endowment followed by
trading may then be repeated. Finally, subjects are compensated according to
their performance in the session.
To summarize, typical parameters describing a treatment are: 1) the num-
ber and types of subjects used, 2) the number of assets and their values to
subjects, 3) the type of trading mechanism used, and 4) the number of times
the endowment and market cycle is repeated. What follows is a brief descrip-
tion of each of these elements, including possible values and their effect on the
basic SSW bubble environment.
2.3.1 Subjects
Number of Subjects
The number of participants in the market can range from one (trading against
an automated counter-party, as in Feldman and Friedman (2008)), to several
hundred or thousand (as in Drehmann et al. (2005), who conduct an internet
experiment for the study of thick markets).
Subject pool
The most common type of subject used in asset market experiments are un-
dergraduate university students. There are at least two reasons for this. The
first is that they provide an ample source of reasonably well-educated, yet still
inexpensive, supply of labor for running sessions. The second is that since
they are readily available to many researchers, they provide a common pop-
ulation for replicating findings. Subjects may be selected according to many
attributes, including traditional socio-demographic variables such as years of
education and ethnicity, but also according to level of experience (in both ex-
periments and/or trading environments).
The SSW study includes sessions that utilize members of the local business
community, yet they still find substantial bubbles. Cheung and Palan (2009)
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find that males tend to behave more extremely in the bubble market setting.
2.3.2 Assets
Number of Assets
Subjects are endowed with one or more types of assets that they are able to
trade for cash. In most cases, there is only one type of asset, however it is not
uncommon for multiple assets to exist. A special case of multiple assets is a
futures market (see below).
Multiple Markets
Various authors have studied how the simultaneous presence of multiple mar-
kets affects bubble formation. Fisher and Kelly (2000) study an SSW design,
but with two tradeable assets. They consider various treatments that vary the
variability of the returns from the two assets. In general they find that both
markets tend to bubble and crash at the same time, although they find that
bubbles are larger for riskier assets, a result also confirmed in Ackert et al.
(2002).
Futures Markets
Noussair and Tucker (2006), building on the work of Porter and Smith (1995),
consider the effect of the presence of futures markets on market performance.
Futures markets are markets in which contracts are agreed upon in the present
regarding the future sale and purchase of goods. Given the tendency of exper-
imental markets to end with little mis-pricing, the authors hypothesize that
futures markets would help agents backward induct pricing at fundamentals
earlier in the market. So in addition to the ability to make trades in the current
spot market, subjects were given the opportunity make trades in future mar-
kets pertaining to periods of time between all remaining earnings payments
(Porter and Smith considered a more limited set of future markets). They find
that sufficient futures trading capacity is very effective at inducing pricing at
fundamental values.
2.3.3 Valuation Mechanism
One of the reasons subjects may value shares is because shares generate earn-
ings for their owners. Uncertainty may (in the case of random dividends) or
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may not (in the case of certain dividends) exist in a subject’s earnings distri-
bution. The distribution may also vary across subjects (as is the case in Cham-
berlin (1948)) and time (as is the case in Chapter 3). Shares can also differ in
their dividend frequency: typically earnings are generated either only once at
the end of the market, or at regular intervals during the market.
The valuation mechanism is particularly important because it defines the
competitive equilibrium, or fundamental, values for the assets. Specifically,
the intersection of the demand and supply curves associated with expected
earnings for each trader define a competitive equilibrium price at which trad-
ing will take place. This is equivalent to the expected earnings on a share from
the median trader. In the special case where all traders face the same distribu-
tion of earnings on a share and are risk neutral, the competitive price is equal
to the expected earnings of all traders.
Porter and Smith (1995) find that eliminating the uncertainty from divi-
dends does not eliminate bubbles. van Boening et al. (2000), however, show
that breaking up a single dividend payment into smaller payments increases
bubble size. Specifically, large bubbles are observed when dividends are paid
periodically throughout the market, whereas very little over-pricing occurs
when only a single terminal payout is used. Noussair et al. (2001) show that
the result pertaining to markets with a single terminal value is not the result
of having a market with constant fundamentals, but is instead caused by the
form of the dividend payments. The study finds that bubbles can easily occur
in markets with constant fundamentals and regular earnings payouts. Most
recently, Lei and Vesely (2009) find that substantial experience with dividends
before the opening of the market eliminates bubbles.
2.3.4 Trading Mechanism
Type of Interaction
The interaction between subjects may either take place in person, electroni-
cally in a local computer laboratory, or completely anonymously (via the In-
ternet, for example). Additionally, trading may take place in a centralized
exchange, or through smaller group (or pair-wise) exchanges. Finally, there
are various ways in which market information may be presented to subjects.
The simplest way in this day and age is to present everything using a com-
puter interface. Before the advent of computerized trading interfaces, how-
ever, subjects were often presented with physical cards containing informa-
tion regarding the properties of the asset and their trading opportunities.
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Trading Institution
The most popular choice of trading institution is the type of institution orginally
studied by SSW. These are auction markets, where one or both sides of the
market post and accept offers. Another popular institution is a “call” (or
“sealed-offer”) market, where both sides of the market submit sealed offers
that then generate a market clearing price according to some matching method
(see, for example, Boening et al. (1993)). Lugovskyy et al. (2009) study bubbles
and crashes in the presence of a tâtonnement pricing mechanism. Tâtonnement
is a system in which bids and offers are successive matched until an equilib-
rium price is reached (where demand equals supply). The previous authors
show that such a pricing mechanism, which allows for substantial learning
regarding equilibrium values, significantly mitigates bubbles sizes.
Trading Restrictions
Restrictions may or may not include 1) the ability to only buy or only sell
shares, 2) the inability to borrow cash or shares, 3) restrictions on permiss-
able prices, 4) restrictions on the number of units that may be bought or sold,
and/or 5) the ability to participate in futures markets.
The specific case of common share valuations is particularly interesting
since the only seemingly rational reasons for trading under these conditions
are due to 1) speculation and 2) the re-allocation of risk. Lei et al. (2001) ex-
amine essentially the same market design as Smith et al. (1988) but with an
additional treatment - a design in which one half of the subjects are restricted
to only selling shares and the other half is restricted to only buying. Under
these conditions, speculative behavior is essentially eliminated as a trading
motivation since no subject is able to purchase with the hopes of re-selling in
the future to someone else at, for example, a higher price. This means that
theoretically the only reason left to trade is the (relatively mild) inclination to
re-allocate risk.
What they find, surprisingly, is that bubbles still result! They report a
substantial number of share purchases for prices higher than the maximum
amount of potential dividends. They further investigate whether the bubbles
can be explained by some experimenter-induced effect that causes subjects to
trade by opening single-period markets simulatenously for the duration of
the first market. As expected, this reduces the impetus for subjects to be bi-
ased towards trading in the first market, however this does not eliminate the
bubble pattern from prices. This is supported by the findings that taxes on
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trades (King et al. (1993)) and capital gains (Lei et al. (2002)) are not effective
at pushing prices closer to fundamentals. The conclusion of this work is that
at least some part of bubble outcomes is due to irrational behavior, and not
completely due to speculation.
Short selling is the act of “borrowing” and selling units of the asset in the
present, in exchange for the obligation to purchase them at a later date. With-
out short selling, a trader who thinks that prices will fall in the future can
only sell all of their share holdings and wait for prices to fall. With short sell-
ing, they can “borrow” more shares and sell them if they so desire, effectively
increasing the opportunity to speculate that prices will fall.
Haruvy and Noussair (2006) examine the effect of a variety of short selling
rules. One comparison they make is between a treatment without short selling
and treatments with a short selling capacity of various units per trader. They
find (contrary to King et al. (1993), who study a weaker relaxation of the short
selling constraint) that sufficient short selling capacity significantly decreases
price levels. In effect, their results suggest that bubbles are sensitive to the
ability of traders to speculate in the downward direction. This is in accord
with other previous findings for both bubble (Ackert et al. (2002)) and non-
bubble asset markets (Vorsatz and Veiga (2008)), but a novel finding is that
short selling may not always push prices to fundamental values. It may, in
fact, create reverse-bubbles! From the results on short selling and the previous
results on speculation, the picture that emerges is that how strong of an effect
speculation has on the bubble formation process is still an open question.
2.3.5 Repetition
The first market in a session may be followed sequentially by another similar
market. At the end of the first market, subjects are endowed with new units
of cash and shares and then participate in the next market, that may or may
not exactly replicate the previous market. Variations on this theme include
mixing subjects across sessions of the same treatment, either with subjects of
the same or different experience level.
Building on the original results reported in SSW, various authors have con-
tinued to study the role of experience and expectations during bubble mar-
kets. Boening et al. (1993) confirm the dampening effect of experience on bub-
bles in the context of posted-offer markets, while Dufwenberg et al. (2005)
verify that bubbles in mixed-experience markets are rare.
Haruvy et al. (2007) offer a rigorous confirmation of the effect of experience
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on convergence in a study designed to study the adaptive behavior of traders’
beliefs. Specifically, they use the SSW design with the four consecutive mar-
kets. In the six sessions they report, they observe large bubbles in the first mar-
ket and steady convergence to fundamentals in the three subsequent markets.
Traders’ beliefs about future prices tend to be closely related to their experi-
ence in previous markets. That is, traders tend to expect that what occurred
in previous markets will repeat itself in future markets. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, however, these beliefs consistently over-estimate the duration and size
of the subsequent bubble. The intuition for this is that if everyone expects a
bubble to pop at a particular level and time, everyone will begin selling off
their shares just before that particular level and time, thus meaning that the
market crashes earlier than everyone had expected.
The results of this section tend to give the impression that repeated market
experience is effective at eliminating bubbles. However, Hussam et al. (2008)
find that bubbles can be “rekindled” if experienced groups of traders partic-
ipate in an environment with substantially different parameters than the one
in which they gained their experience. This suggests that subjects might not
actually be “learning” to correct irrational behaviors, but instead adjust their
trading behavior as a best-response to a belief that future markets will display
price patterns similar to those they have already experienced.
2.4 Structure of the Study Chapters
Since the original work by Smith, Suchanek and Williams, a plethora of stud-
ies have joined the hunt to figure out what makes market bubbles “tick”. The
previous section has sketched the basic anatomy of a bubble experiment and
surveyed some of the findings related to their study. The chapters that follow
deal with many related topics: Chapter 3 is an investigation of how dividend
streams can affect price discovery, Chapter 4 considers how firm interventions
in the market can influence the bubble formation process, and Chapter 5 is a
closer examination of how subjects’ use of the trading environment is related
to aggregate price movements. As each of these chapters contains an exper-
iment on bubble markets, they share many common features. These include
the presentation of the study itself, the design of the underlying experiment,
and methods used in analyzing the experimental data. Each of these features
is discussed in more detail below.
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2.4.1 Presentation
Each of the following three study chapters essentially have the following struc-
ture. They begin in Section 1 with an introduction to the particular topic at
hand. This is followed in Section 2 by a list of the specific hypotheses related
to the topic. Section 3 presents the design of the experiment and Section 4 dis-
cusses its results. Section 5 briefly summarizes the main points of the study
and provides some concluding remarks.
2.4.2 Design
The experimental protocol, based on the Smith et al. (1988) study, is as follows.
No subject participated more than once in an experiment. Sessions were
conducted in English at Tilburg University. Markets were computerized and
used continuous double auction trading rules implemented with the z-Tree
computer program (Fischbacher (2007)) developed at the University of Zurich.
Subjects were students enrolled at Tilburg University, typically undergradu-
ates in economics and business.
In each session, N subjects participated in one or more sequential markets,
all identical in parametric structure. Every subject began all markets of a ses-
sion with a particular endowment of cash (referred to during the experiment
as “francs”) and units of an asset. Initial cash and asset endowments were cho-
sen to approximately equalize expected earnings across all sessions, although
actual realized earnings at the individual level depend on the distribution of
asset holdings, the dividend realizations, and the trading strategies employed.
Subjects knew their own initial endowments, but not the initial endowments
of others.
For the duration of each market, subjects were able to trade units of the
asset for cash amongst themselves by placing and accepting orders from an
open order book. Borrowing and short selling were not allowed. “Francs”
were used for all transcations and payments within a market. Trades were for
a single unit of the asset at a time.
This meant that at any time subjects could submit an offer to the market,
provided that they had sufficient cash or units to fulfill their part of the trans-
action. An offer specifies a price at which the agent is willing to either buy or
sell a share. Any trader with sufficient funds and units of asset to complete the
transaction may accept any outstanding offer at any point in time. All offers
were displayed to all agents on their computer screens. Upon acceptance of
an offer, a trade was conducted and the asset and cash transferred between
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Table 2.1: Design Parameters
Parameter Value
T, number of periods 15
distribution of dividends uniform from (0, 8, 28, 60)
N, number of subjects 9
the transacting parties.
The duration of the market was divided into T periods of equal length.
At the end of each period, the asset paid a dividend that was immediately
added to cash holdings. The dividends were independently drawn from a
distribution that was identical for all periods and units of the asset. Thus, in
any period the expected dividend on a unit of the asset was equal to the ex-
pected value of the dividend distribution. Because the dividends were drawn
independently each period, the expected future dividend stream in period t,
∑Ti=t E(dt), equaled the expected period dividend multiplied by the number of
periods remaining in the life of the asset, so that ∑ E(dt) = (T − t + 1)E(dt).
When dividends were the only source of intrinsic value for the asset (Chapter
3 is an exception), in period t the fundamental value ft of the asset equaled





E(dt) = (T − t + 1) · E(dt).
The payment of a dividend at the end of a period reduced the fundamental
value by E(dt) francs immediately after the payment, since the number of
future dividend payments decreased by one.
Inventories of assets and cash carried over from one period to the next.
Thus for each individual, the quantities of cash and assets held at the begin-
ning of period t + 1 were the same as those held at the end of period t, adjust-
ing for any dividends received.
Earnings
A subject’s entire earnings over a market were equal to the amount of “francs”
he held at the end of that market. A subject’s earnings for the entire experi-
ment were then equal to the sum of his earnings from each of the markets
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of the session, plus an additional participation fee. Francs were converted to
Euros at a pre-announced rate.
Sequence of Events
The experimenter first distributed and read aloud a detailed explanation of
how to make and accept offers with the electronic trading interface. This took
approximately five minutes. For the next ten minutes subjects practiced trad-
ing using the interface. Activity during this phase did not count toward final
earnings. After the practice phase was completed, the rest of the instructions,
which described all other aspects of the experiment, were handed out and
read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects were then assigned their initial port-
folios of cash and shares and the (first of potentially many) market(s) for the
asset was conducted. At the end of a session, subjects were called out of the
room one by one and paid anonymously for their participation in the session.
2.4.3 Notation
When a variable only has one subscript, for example xt, ∆xt will be defined as
the first difference of that variable, so that ∆xt = xt − xt−1. When a variable
has more than a single subscript, for example xm,t, the subscript on ∆ will in-
dicate the subscript with respect to which the difference is taken. For example,
∆mxm,t = xm,t − xm−1,t and ∆txm,t = xm,t − xm,t−1. Where possible, subscripts
will be suppressed for clarity.
2.4.4 Analysis
Each study consists of a series of observations, or sessions, of an asset market
setting. For period t ∈ (1, . . . , T) of session i, let f it denote the fundamental
value of the asset and let pit denote the observed period median transaction
price.
Two measures of mispricing formally introduced by Haruvy and Noussair
(2006) are Dispersion and Bias. Both depend on the period bias, which is the
difference between the median transaction price pt and fundamental value
ft in period t of session i e.g. biasit = p
i
t − f it . Formally, the measures of
mispricing are defined as follows:
Dispersioni = ∑t |biasit|
Biasi = ∑t biasit
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Dispersion is a measure of overall discrepancy between prices and fundamen-
tals, where larger values indicate larger differences between prices and funda-
mentals. Bias is a measure of systematic over-or under-pricing, where higher
values indicate higher prices, and where a value of zero reflects equal aver-
age prices and fundamentals. Lower values of Dispersion, which has a lower
bound of zero, are interpreted as more effective price level discovery. Values
of Bias closer to zero are similarly interpreted as indicating better price level
discovery.
One sees great things from the valley; only
small things from the peak.
Gilbert K. Chesterton
CHAPTER 3
PEAKS AND VALLEYS: MARKETS WITH
NON-MONOTONIC FUNDAMENTALS1
This chapter reports the results of an experiment designed to measure how
well asset market prices track fundamentals when the latter experience peaks,
and alternatively, troughs. The speed of the price discovery process, whereby
markets converge to fundamental values as the market is repeated, is ob-
served to differ between the two treatments. The process is more rapid and
complete in markets in which fundamentals rise to a peak and then decline,
than in markets in which fundamentals decline to a trough and undergo a
subsequent increase. The findings demonstrate that the characteristics of the
time path of the fundamental value can influence the degree to which prices
track fundamentals.
3.1 Introduction
The conjecture investigated here is that the tendency for an asset to track its
fundamental value depends on properties of the time-profile of the funda-
mental, because under some profiles the process of price discovery is slower
and less complete.
A feature of many economic time series is that they experience peaks or
troughs, and thus experience periods of rising value followed by periods of
1This chapter is based on Noussair and Powell (2010).
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decline, or rather episodes of increasing value that follow a decline. Despite
the fact that such a structure is common, and that such market peaks and
troughs are often optimal times to trade, markets with these properties have
not to date been investigated with experimental methods. This chapter re-
ports the results of an experiment designed to directly compare, in a controlled
manner, the behavior of (i) markets for assets that experience a period of in-
creasing, and then a period of falling, fundamentals, versus (ii) markets in
which fundamentals first decline and then rise.
The first type of market is referred to as a Peak market, and the second as a
Valley market. The Peak and Valley markets are symmetric in the sense that the
assets are traded over an equal time horizon, experience a peak or trough in
fundamental values of equal magnitude compared to initial and final values,
and experience their extreme fundamental value at the same time. Thus, the
experiment is designed so that there is an opportunity for asymmetries in the
reaction of prices to peaks and troughs in fundamentals to appear and to be
identified. The existence of a pricing asymmetry would be consistent with an
intuition that has been expressed by some policymakers with regard to the
behavior of macroeconomic variables2.
The extent to which price discovery has occurred is measured with three
different indicators: (a) the magnitude of the differences between price lev-
els in the asset markets and the underlying fundamental values, (b) the con-
sistency with which price trends reflect trends in underlying fundamentals,
and (c) the difference between the timing of peaks and troughs of prices and
those of fundamentals. The design, in which the same individuals participate
in four sequential markets, allows for the study of how differences between
treatments, with regard to the pricing accuracy measures above, evolve with
repeated interaction in a sequence of markets.
The findings are that markets that experience a peak have a stronger and
more rapid tendency to converge toward fundamental pricing as traders gain
more experience than markets that undergo a trough. Thus, in the markets
2This intuition has been voiced, for example, by former US Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan who in a recent interview indicated “What strikes me about the current pe-
riod is it’s wholly consistent with my generalized view of how important innate human char-
acteristics are in sustaining the business cycle. I’ve always been concerned that in setting up
an econometric model you take history irrespective of whether it’s up or down, and there’s
an implicit judgment that the coefficients work symmetrically on the upside and downside.
There is a general belief, for example, that capital gains on homes have a buoyant effect on
consumption going up and precisely the same on the other side. I’m beginning to question
whether that premise is true” (Alan Greenspan, Sept. 17, 2007).
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studied here, the likelihood that an asset market tracks fundamental value
depends on the process that fundamentals follow. In other words, one envi-
ronment is more conducive to pricing at fundamentals than the other, simply
because of the interaction between the trader behavior that appears in asset
markets and the particular process guiding the time path of fundamentals.
The consistency between prices and fundamentals depends not only on previ-
ously identified factors such as the market institutions in place, the regulatory
framework, and the number, experience level, and sophistication of traders,
which are all controlled for in these markets, but also on the time path of the
fundamental values.
The assets studied in this literature are almost exclusively finitely-lived, pay
non-negative dividends at regular intervals, and are created in settings where
no alternative interest-bearing investments exist. This means that the assets
have fundamental values that decrease monotonically over time3. For this
special case of declining fundamentals, the literature has yielded consistent
results about the behavior of asset prices (see Chapter 2). The current study
appears to be the first experimental study in which the behavioral properties
of markets experiencing a peak or trough in fundamentals are investigated.
3.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses concern the differences between two different experimental
treatments, Peak and Valley, with regard to various criteria of effectiveness of
the price discovery process. Effectiveness of price discovery refers to consis-
tency between prices and fundamentals, and how this consistency evolves as
the market is repeated and as traders gain more experience.
The degree of consistency between the prices and fundamentals is calcu-
lated in terms of three criteria: (1) levels, (2) trends, and (3) timing of changes
in trend.
The first treatment comparison is with respect to price level discovery: the
difference between price levels and fundamentals over the life of the asset.
Bias and Dispersion are used to measure whether price levels track fundamen-
tal value to the same extent across treatments. Hypothesis 1 is that the distri-
bution of price level discovery, taking each session as an observation, does not
3Experimental studies of long-lived asset markets have focused almost exclusively on the
case of monotonically decreasing fundamental values, with a few exceptions (Camerer and
Weigelt (1993); Noussair et al. (2001); Ball and Holt (1998)) that study assets with constant
fundamental values.
30 STUDY: PEAKS AND VALLEYS
differ significantly between treatments.
Hypothesis 1 Price levels track fundamentals equally closely in the two treatments.
While Hypothesis 1 is concerned with price levels, Hypothesis 2 addresses a
similar question about the relationship between trends in prices and funda-
mentals. In an efficient market, price trends send accurate signals to investors
and observers about whether the intrinsic value of an asset is currently in-
creasing or decreasing. The question considered here is whether prices are
equally likely to move in the same direction as fundamentals in the two treat-
ments. Let TDit = 1 if sign(∆p
i
t) = sign(∆ f
i
t ) and 0 otherwise, and define
TDi = ∑t TDit/T. The variable TD
i, referred to as trend discovery (TD), mea-
sures the percentage of periods in session i in which current price changes are
in the same direction as current fundamental value changes. Greater values
indicate better discovery of the underlying trend in fundamentals and the up-
per bound of 1 corresponds to movement of prices and fundamentals in the
same direction in all periods. A test is conducted for whether or not trend dis-
covery differs between treatments corresponds to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Price trends are equally consistent with trends in fundamentals in the
two treatments.
Whether or not the observed price vector accurately reflects the time at which
prices attain their extreme value (maximum in Peak, minimum in Valley) is also
considered. This period is referred to as the turning point of prices and is com-
pared to the turning point in fundamentals, which is the analogous period for
the fundamental value process4. For Valley sessions, let t∗i = arg mint∈(2,...,T−1) p
i
t,
and let t∗i = arg maxt∈(2,...,T−1) p
i
t for Peak sessions. t
∗
i denotes the turning
point in prices in session i. Furthermore, define periods t
′
i = arg mint∈(2,...,T−1) p
i
t
for Valley sessions, and let t
′
i = arg maxt∈(2,...,T−1) p
i
t for Peak sessions. Period
t
′
i is called the turning point in fundamentals in session i and the turning point
of fundamentals is said to have “been discovered” if t∗i = t
′
i, so that a price
peak (trough) signals that the asset’s value has also reached a maximum (min-
imum). The turning point discovery of session i is defined as TPi = |t∗i − t
′
i|.
Smaller values, which are closer to the lower bound of zero, indicate better
turning point discovery. Hypothesis 3 is that the distribution of turning point
discovery, by session, is similar in the two treatments.
4In the analysis that follows, the actual fundamentals in a session is used to calculate all
measures and in conducting all statistical tests, taking into account the slight differences in
fundamental values between sessions V1-V2 and V3-V5.
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Hypothesis 3 The time difference between the turning points of prices and turning
points of fundamentals is the same in the two treatments.
As described in more detail below in Section 3.3, each experimental session
consists of several repetitions of an asset market with the same participants.
This repeated market feature allows hypotheses 1 - 3 to be evaluated seper-
ately for each of the resulting experience levels. It also allows the groups to
be tracked over time and the effect that repetition of the market has on the
price discovery measures to be considered. Specifically, whether or not price
discovery improves at all with repetition in the market is considered, and if
so, whether or not it also improves at a similar rate in both treatments. Let
the subscript m on a price discovery measure index the repetition of the mar-
ket, so that Dim, Bim, TDim, and TPim denote dispersion, bias, trend discovery,
and turning point discovery, respectively, in market m of session i. The null
hypotheses advanced here is that repetition improves all measures of price
discovery, and that it does so at a similar rate in both treatments.
Hypothesis 4 Price discovery increases with repetition.
Hypothesis 5 The rate of improvement in price discovery is identical in the two
treatments.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experiment had two treatments, called Peak and Valley. The Peak treat-
ment was characterized by a time path of fundamentals that was increasing
during the first half of each market and decreasing during the second half. In
Valley sessions, fundamentals first declined and then recovered. In all cases,
the fundamental value attained an extremum in period T/2 of each market.
The fundamental value of the asset arose from three sources: dividends,
taxes, and a final buyout (a payment for each unit of asset held at the end of
the market to the unit’s owner). These were payments to or by the current
owners of the asset on each unit they held. At any point in time the fun-
damental value was the sum of the expected future payments from all three
sources. Specifically, the fundamental value of a unit of the asset during any
period was equal to the sum of the expected dividends and final buyout it
would generate, minus any taxes that remained to be paid on the unit. Thus,
the fundamental value of one unit of the asset at any point in time was the ex-
pected value of the stream of future payments that would result from holding
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the unit for the remainder of the current market. The three different sources of
value were included in the design merely to induce the appropriate dynamic
patterns in fundamental values5. The number and timing of future dividend
draws, tax payments, and final buyouts in the current market was always
common knowledge.
Certain periods of each market were tax periods. After every tax period,
subjects paid a fixed inventory tax for each unit in their possession. Due to
the fact that the size of the period tax was always larger than the expected
dividend, the difference between the expected dividend to be received and
the tax to be paid during tax periods was always negative. Thus, after each
tax period, the fundamental value increased, as the future liability on each
unit of the asset decreased.
The third determinant of the fundamental value was the final buyout, or
terminal value, of the asset. Each unit yielded a final payment at the end of
the market, in addition to any dividends and taxes that were collected and
paid. The final buyout value increased the fundamental value of the asset for
the entire life of the asset. Its sole purpose was to ensure that the asset always
had a positive fundamental value.











where dt and τit denote the dividend and the tax in effect in period t of session
i and Bi is the final buyout or terminal value.
A number of consecutive markets were conducted within each session.
Subjects started each market with their initial portfolio of assets and cash.
Thus markets within a session were ex-ante identical, except for the prior ex-
perience level of the participants. Parameter choices are given in Table 3.1.
Thus the Valley treatment consisted of markets in which the fundamental
value was decreasing in the early periods of the market, and increasing in
later periods. In two of the Valley sessions (V1 and V2), the trough of fun-
damentals occurred in period 9, whereas the trough occurred in period 8 for
the other three sessions (V3 - V5)6. The time path of fundamentals in the two
treatments is illustrated in Figure 3.1. At all times subjects knew what the
5The same pattern could have been achieved solely through an appropriately specified
dividend process. However, this would have required a non-stationary dividend distribution
that included negative “dividends”, an unfamiliar concept that participants might find more
difficult to grasp.
6The same pattern could have been achieved solely through an appropriately specified
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Table 3.1: Design Parameters
Parameter Value
Peak Valley
period length 120 seconds
exchange rate 400 francs = 1 Euro
number of 4
consecutive markets
τt, tax amount 48
initial portfolios (3, 1233) (3, 729)
(shares, cash) (2, 1257) (2, 921)
(1, 1281) (1, 1113)
tax periodsa 1, . . . , 7 9, . . . , 15
B, buyout value 0 216
a Tax periods in sessions V1 and V2 are periods
8, . . . , 15.
fundamental value would be in all future periods, and thus the change in the
trend of fundamentals could be fully anticipated. The instructions provided
to subjects are given in Appendix 3.A.
Dividends and final buyout payments were added to individuals’ cash bal-
ances at the time they were paid, and taxes were subtracted from cash bal-
ances at the moment they were incurred. This meant that dividend payments
added to and taxes subtracted from the cash that could be used for subsequent
purchases.
In addition to the common design described in Chapter 2, at the end of
markets one, two, and three, subjects were informed that their next task in the
experiment would be to participate in another market identical to the one they
had just finished.
dividend process. However, this would have required a non-stationary dividend distribu-
tion that included negative “dividends”, a concept that was felt would be more difficult for
participants to comprehend.
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Figure 3.1: Time Paths of Fundamentals
3.4 Results
Figure 3.2 shows the time series of median transaction prices by period in each
of the Peak and the Valley sessions, respectively. The bold lines indicate the
fundamental value. Each of the time series of data corresponds to one session.
Overall, the figures indicate that (i) prices are usually higher than fundamen-
tal values, (ii) prices deviate less from fundamentals as traders become more
experienced, (iii) prices track fundamentals more closely in later than in ear-
lier periods within a market, (iv) deviations from fundamentals are larger in
the Valley than in the Peak treatment and (v) repetition of a market decreases
price deviations more in Peak than in Valley7.
In markets 1 and 2 of the Peak treatment, shown in panel a of Figure 3.2,
prices are usually greater than fundamentals in the early periods of the mar-
ket, and then operate at close to fundamentals in the latter periods. Sessions
2 and 4 experience particularly large booms8. By market 4, prices track fun-
7The data on the volume of trade indicate that all of the markets were thick and active.
Consider market Turnover, a measure of market activity employed in the analysis of experi-
mental markets (King et al., 1993; Van Boening et al., 1993; Porter and Smith, 1995). Turnover
equals the total volume of trade over the T-period market horizon, divided by the total stock
of units, which is the total inventory of units of asset all individuals hold. Table 3.7 in Ap-
pendix 3.A reports the value of Turnover for each of the ten sessions of the experiment. The
table indicates that in the Peak treatment, the average value (across sessions) of Turnover is
7.8 in market 1, and declines to 2.6 by market 4. In the Valley treatment, the average value
is 7.8 in market 1, and decreases to 3.3 in market 4. These high levels of transaction activity
indicate that the markets were active and that the observed episodes of mispricing are not a
phenomenon associated with thin markets.
8To avoid rescaling of the figures, the prices of some periods in market 1 of sessions P2 and
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damentals closely in four of the five Peak sessions. In the Valley treatment,
shown in the second panel of Figure 3.2, prices begin substantially below fun-
damental value in market 1. The prices then typically exhibit booms relative to
fundamentals, increasing to levels well above fundamentals by the middle of
the market and remaining above fundamentals for the remainder of the mar-
ket. In subsequent markets, prices exceed fundamentals throughout the life of
the asset. Late in markets 3 and 4, prices tend to crash to near fundamentals,
which they then track for the remainder of the market. However, in those mar-
kets of the Valley treatment exhibiting a price trough and rebound, the time of
the turnaround in prices is typically later than the turning point of fundamen-
tals. Overall, the figures suggest that prices track fundamental values better
in the Peak than in the Valley treatment. Result 3.1 reports the findings of the
analysis comparing price level discovery in the two treatments.
P4 are not shown. These prices are 600, 800, and 600 in periods 7 - 9 of market 1 of P2, and
800, 750, and 700 in periods 8 - 10 of market 1 of P4.
36 STUDY: PEAKS AND VALLEYS
Figure 3.2: Period Prices Relative to Fundamentals
(a) Peak Sessions
(b) Valley sessions
Result 3.1 Price levels in Peak sessions are closer to fundamentals than they are in
Valley sessions. That is, price level discovery is better in the Peak than in the Valley
treatment. Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
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Support for Result 3.1 Figure 3.3 displays the observed values of Dispersion
and Bias in the two treatments, averaged across the five sessions within each
treatment9. Recall that values of Dispersion as well as Bias closer to zero indi-
cate better price level discovery.
The results show that mispricing in Valleys is consistently greater than in
Peaks by markets 3 and 4.
Figure 3.3: Measures of Price Level Discovery
Notes: Peak (dark bars) and Valley (light bars), averaged over sessions and relative to
Peak-Market 1.
Table 3.2 indicates the results of two-sided rank-sum tests of differences in
Dispersion and Bias between the two treatments. The test is conducted sepa-
rately for the data from each of the four markets, which correspond to four
different trader experience levels. Each session is used as the unit of observa-
tion, so that there are five observations from each treatment for each market.
The columns indicate the mispricing measure under consideration. The rows
correspond to the market(s) used for the comparison. The table shows that
the hypothesis of equality between the two treatments can be rejected at the
5% level for both measures in favor of the alternative that they come from dif-
ferent distributions. Neither of the measures is significantly different between
treatments if only the data from markets 1 or 2 is considered.
9The values of each measure for each market in each session of the Peak and Valley treat-
ments are given in Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.A. The table also reports the values of trend and
turning point discovery for each market and session. Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.A contains the
results from an analysis of treatment differences using several other measures of price devia-
tion from fundamental value that have appeared in the experimental literature (see King et al.
(1993), Boening et al. (1993), or Porter and Smith (1995).
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Table 3.2: Significance Levels of Treatment Differences
Trend Turning
Market Dispersion Bias Discovery Point
1 0.347 0.465 0.008 0.086
2 0.175 0.175 0.035 0.287
3 0.047 0.047 0.245 0.595
4 0.028 0.028 0.090 0.034
Notes: Rank-sum tests of treatment differences in price
discovery measures. Reported value is the significance level
at which the hypothesis of equal distributions across
treatments can be rejected. N = 10.
Next, the analysis turns to trend discovery, the measure of how consistently
price changes from one period to the next are in the same direction as move-
ments in fundamental values. Trend discovery is found to be better in Peak
than in Valley treatments, for both markets with inexperienced and markets
with experienced participants.
Result 3.2 Price trends more accurately reflect underlying trends in fundamentals
in Peak than in Valley markets. Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
Support for Result 3.2 : Table 3.3 shows the fraction of periods in which prices
and fundamentals move in the same direction, in each treatment and for each
market. The first row of data, labeled Peak Treatment, shows the percentage
of periods in the Peak treatment, in which prices and fundamentals move in
the same direction. The next two rows indicate the similar percentage, for the
subset of periods in which fundamentals are increasing (row 2) and decreas-
ing (row 3) separately. The next three rows display the analogous data for
the Valley treatment. The first four columns display the data for each market
separately, and the fifth column contains the pooled data for all markets.
Table 3.3 shows that in over three quarters of periods in the Peak treatment,
prices move in the same direction as fundamentals. In market 1 this percent-
age is 81.4%, and after decreasing somewhat in market 2, recovers to 82.9%
in market 4. Peak market prices are especially likely to follow the same trend
as fundamentals when fundamentals are decreasing (90.7% of periods) in the
later periods of the markets. In the Valley treatment, price movements are in
the same direction as fundamental changes in fewer than half of the periods
in markets one and two, and reach a level of consistency of greater than 60%
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Table 3.3: Price Trend Discovery
Market(s)
Treatment Periods 1 2 3 4 All
Peak all .814 .729 .757 .829 .782
ft > ft−1 .686 .571 .629 .743 .657
ft < ft−1 .943 .886 .886 .914 .907
Valley all .400 .414 .514 .629 .489
ft > ft−1 .515 .364 .545 .636 .515
ft < ft−1 .297 .459 .486 .622 .466
all all .607 .571 .636 .729 .636
only by market 4. Overall, in the Valley treatment, prices move in the same
direction as fundamentals 49.8% of the time, a percentage similar to one that
would be obtained by assuming that price movements were independent of
underlying fundamentals. No systematic difference in the level of consistency
between price and fundamental value trends is observed between periods in
which fundamentals are increasing versus when they are decreasing. Table 1
indicates the results of the test of the hypothesis that the distribution of Trend
Discovery is the same across treatments (as indicated previously, each session
is used as the unit of observation). The hypothesis is rejected in markets 1 and
2 at the 5% level, and in market 4 at the 10% level.
Attention now turns to turning point discovery, the relationship between the
timing of the turning point of fundamentals and the turning point in prices.
The observations are summarized below as Result 3.3.
Result 3.3 Turning point discovery is better in the Peak than in the Valley treat-
ment. Hypothesis 3.3 is rejected. By market 4 in the Peak treatment, the average
turning point of prices in the Peak treatment is very close to that of fundamentals.
In the Valley treatment, the turning point of prices is consistently later than that of
fundamentals.
Support for Result 3.3 : Figure 3.4 shows the difference between the turn-
ing points in prices and in fundamentals by market in each session. Positive
values on the horizontal axis indicate that prices change direction later than
fundamentals. The vertical axis indicates the number of sessions (out of a to-
tal of five) that the difference between the two turning points equals the value
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of the horizontal axis for the market shown in the panel. The turning points
of prices are on average earlier than those for fundamentals in the Peak treat-
ment in markets 1 - 3, but the difference is close to zero by market 4. The
average turning point of prices in Valley is close to that of fundamentals in
market 1, although all but one of the actual turning points of prices is at least
4 periods away from the turning point of fundamentals. However, in Valley,
after the first market, price turning points are consistently later than those of
fundamentals, and later than those in the Peak treatment.
The fourth column of data in table 4 contains the significance levels of rank-
sum tests of the hypothesis that the distribution of turning point discovery
is equal between the two treatments. The tests show that in market 4, the
hypothesis of equality is rejected at the 5% level. The hypothesis is rejected at
the 10% level for market 1.
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Figure 3.4: Turning Point Differences
The patterns regarding the effect of experience on price discovery are summa-
rized as Result 3.4.
Result 3.4 Price level discovery improves with repetition in the Peak but not in the
Valley treatment.
Support for Result 4 Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of price level discovery
in the markets as they are repeated and traders gain experience. In the Peak
treatment, there is a tendency for market mispricing to decrease with repeti-
tion and thus for price level discovery to improve. In the Peak treatment, each
measure of mispricing has an average value in market 4 that is less than 1/3
of the value in market 1. However, in the Valley treatment, dispersion is only
on average 30% lower in market 4 than in market 1, and bias is a mere 2%
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lower. While the measures are comparable in magnitude in market 1, by the
final market dispersion is more than three time and bias more than four times
greater in Valley than in Peak.
Comparing the treatments with regard to changes in trend and turning
point discoveries with repetition yields a mixed picture. While improvement
in the Trend Discovery between markets 1 and 4 is more rapid in the Val-
ley treatment in percentage terms, the decrease in turning point discovery is
greater in percentage terms in Peak than in Valley. However, both begin from a
much more inefficient base in market 1 in the Valley than in the Peak treatment.
Tables 3.3 and 3.6 indicate that the average trend discovery increases from .814
to .829 in Peak, and from .4 to .621 in Valley. Figure 4 shows that the average
turning point discovery improves from 1.4 in market 1 to 0.4 in market 4 for
the Peak treatment. It also decreases from 4.4 in market 1 to 2.4 in market 4 of
the Valley treatment.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the following two types of statistical tests.
The first type is a sign test that considers whether a mispricing measure is
improving (decreasing for dispersion, bias, and turning point discovery, in-
creasing for trend discovery) between consecutive markets within the same
session. The test is conducted for each of the two treatments separately. For
this test, there are fifteen observations in each treatment (5 sessions * (4 - 1)
consecutive market pairs per session). The hypothesis and the resulting sig-
nificance level of the sign test are reported in the first two rows of data in the
table. The second type of test, reported in the final row of Table 3.4, is a rank-
sum test of whether the distribution of percentage changes in a measure of
mispricing from one market to the next is significantly different between the
two treatments.
The first two rows of data in the table indicate the levels of significance
at which the null hypotheses that the value of a mispricing measure is the
same or deteriorating between market m− 1 and m within the sessions can be
rejected. The first row shows that for the Peak treatment, the null hypothesis
is rejected for both dispersion and bias at the 5% level. For Valley, the same
hypotheses cannot be rejected, indicating that there is no significant decrease
in the values of these measures with repetition. The hypothesis, for the Valley
data, that trend discovery is constant or decreasing from one market to the
next is not rejected in favor of the hypothesis that it is increasing. However,
recall that the trend discovery measures in the Valley treatment in markets one
and two are less than 50%, the value that would result if price movements
were purely random, so the improvement occurs from a very low base.
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Table 3.4: Significance Levels of Differences in Price Discovery
Changes Between Markets
Trend Turning Point
Hypothesis Dispersion Bias Discovery Discovery N
1 0.0037 0.0176 0.5000 0.2539 15
2 0.5000 0.5000 0.0461 0.1334 15
3 0.0095 0.0238 0.1965 0.0686 30
Notes: p-values that the hypotheses cannot be rejected are reported.
Hypotheses 1 & 2 are that there is no difference in a given price discovery
measure between consecutive markets in the Peak and Valley treatments,
respectively. Hypothesis 3 is that the difference is equal in the two treatments.
The last row of the table indicates the significance level of a rank-sum test
of the hypothesis that the magnitude of percentage changes in a mispricing
measure from one market to the next is equal between the two treatments.
Significant values indicate rejection of the hypothesis of equality. The data
show that the improvement in price level discovery is significantly different
between Peak and Valley by both measures at p < 0.025. The improvement is
also greater for turning point inefficiency at the p < 0.1 level of significance.
In sessions 2 and 4 of the Peak treatment, an interesting pattern can be seen
in Figure 3.2. In market 1 of these two sessions, large bubbles are observed
in roughly the middle third of the life of the asset. In market 2, prices rise
to relatively high levels early in the life of the asset, suggesting speculation
on an impending repetition of the pattern of the previous market. Individ-
uals demand more of the asset, pushing up prices, based on the belief that
prices will follow a similar trajectory as in the prior market. Afterward, prices
begin to decline before the period of peak prices in the preceding market, sug-
gesting that individuals anticipate a peak to occur at roughly the same time
in market 2 as has previously occurred in market 1, and supply units to the
market before the time at which they anticipate a decline in prices. Thus, the
dynamic pattern from one market to the next is consistent with the idea that
the change in the price trajectory from one market to the next within a session
reflects (a) expectations of a repetition of the price time series that occurred in
the prior market, in conjunction with (b) the use of profitable strategies given
those expectations10.
10Haruvy et al. (2007) have suggested that a similar dynamic is at work for markets with
declining fundamental values.
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To explore whether this backward propagation of prices is a feature of the
overall data, a test for whether changes in prices in period t between one mar-
ket to the next can be explained by the difference between the previous mar-
ket’s prices in period t + 1 relative to period t is conducted. Consider the
following regression specifications:
∆m pm,t = α1 + β1∆t pm−1,t+1 + ε1m,t (3.2)
∆m pm,t = α2 + β2∆tbiasm−1,t+1 + ε2m,t (3.3)
Here, pm,t is the price in period t of market m (indices for session are sup-
pressed for expositional clarity).
The rationale for this specification is the following. Suppose a trader be-
lieves that prices in the current market will be the same as those in the pre-
vious market. Then, if prices in the prior market m − 1 increased between
periods t and t + 1 (pm−1,t+1 > pm−1,t), the trader’s demand in period t of
market m increases in anticipation of the price increase in the next period.
This behavior causes prices to increase in period t of the current market m
relative to the price in period t in the prior market m − 1. An analogous ef-
fect would occur for price decreases. A positive β1 would reveal this effect:
it captures how much the change in price between periods t and t + 1 in the
previous market affects the period t price in the current market. Equation 3.2
considers the effect for absolute price levels and 3.3 for deviations of prices
from fundamentals11.
The results of the regression, presented in Table 3.5, suggest that behavior
is consistent with a certain amount of response to beliefs that previous price
patterns will be repeated. For the Peak treatment, the β coefficients are pos-
itive and significant under both specifications, and have values of 0.59 and
0.63 in equations 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. For the Valley treatments the β co-
efficients are also positive and significant, with larger values than in the Peak
treatment, indicating that the backward propagation of prices is even stronger
in the Valley sessions.
3.5 Conclusion
The experimental markets constructed here are used to obtain the first empir-
ical observations, from a controlled laboratory study, of the behavior of asset
11Note that the dependent variable in Equation 3.3, ∆m pm,t, is also equal to the difference
between markets m− 1 and m in terms of period bias, since ft is the same in all markets.
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Table 3.5: Change in Prices Between Sequential Markets as a Function
of Activity in Prior Market
Treatment
Variable Peak Valley Peak Valley
constant -17.11* -1.72 -16.87* -3.15
(6.68) (8.31) (6.72) (5.87)




Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 210.
markets that experience a peak or a trough in fundamentals. The analysis
focuses on how well the market tracks the fundamental value, how well it re-
flects trends in fundamentals, and how well it reveals the timing of a change
in trend. An additionaly consideration is how these measures of pricing accu-
racy evolve and improve as traders gain more experience through repetition
of the market. The results are not obvious a priori in light of the strong ten-
dency of experimental asset markets to generate bubbles and crashes when
traders are inexperienced, a result that nonetheless has only been established
for assets with fundamental values that are monotonically decreasing or con-
stant over time.
Mispricing relative to fundamental values is typically observed in these
markets populated with inexperienced subjects. As individuals gain experi-
ence, prices move much closer to fundamental values in the Peak treatment, in
a manner similar to that observed in previous studies of experimental markets
with declining fundamental values. However, in the time frame under con-
sideration here, four repetitions of a 15-period market, the Valley treatment
does not move appreciably closer to fundamentals. Price changes from one
period to the next are typically in the same direction as the change in funda-
mentals in the Peak treatment, but not in the Valley treatment. The observed
peaks and troughs in prices accurately reflect the timing of the turnaround in
fundamental values in Peak, but are systematically too late in Valley.
Thus, a pronounced difference is found between the speed and the strength
of the price discovery process in a market when the underlying fundamentals
rise to a peak and then decline, and in a market where the fundamentals de-
cline to a trough and experience a subsequent increase. In the Peak treatment,
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while the markets experience bubbles and crashes when traders are inexpe-
rienced, the markets operate at close to fundamentals after participants have
acquired experience in the environment. On the other hand, a trough in fun-
damentals appears to represent a more challenging environment for the mar-
ket to achieve accurate pricing. Prices consistently fail to reflect the level, the
direction of the trend, and the timing of the turnaround, of fundamentals in
the Valley treatment. The Valley treatment appears to be the first experimental
environment in which asset markets populated by individuals with this level
of experience with a stationary environment do not track fundamental values
closely.
There is considerable debate in the economics profession about the extent
to which markets produce prices that reflect underlying fundamental values.
The evidence obtained here suggests that the answer may be that it depends
on the properties of the process underlying fundamental values and the dy-
namics the process exhibits over time. We identify a strong asymmetry be-
tween how asset markets respond to peaks and troughs in fundamentals. This
occurs even though the treatments are constructed to be similar in terms of
level of complexity, monetary stakes involved, institutional structure, and in
the characteristics of the individuals participating. Indeed, there may also
be characteristics of the time path of fundamentals, other than whether they
exhibit peaks and troughs, that enhance or impede the ability of a market
to track fundamentals. The research presented in this chapter indicates that
characteristics of the fundamental value, in addition to the well-known influ-
ences of the institutional structure and the level of sophistication of traders,
are determinants of price discovery. While this is clearly a property of the lab-
oratory markets under study here, it may also be a feature of markets outside
the laboratory. If so, it suggests a conjecture that the tendency of markets to
conform more closely to some trajectories of fundamentals than others might
potentially reconcile differing conclusions on the extent to which asset mar-
kets display price discovery.
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3.A Appendix
The first table presents the values of the four measures of price discovery (Dis-
persion, Bias, Trend Discovery, and Turning Point Discovery) in each mar-
ket of each session. The table also includes averages and standard deviations
across sessions within each treatment.
The second table, 3.7, shows the values for several measures of market devi-
ation from fundamentals that previous authors (Haruvy and Noussair (2006),
King et al. (1993), Porter and Smith (1995)) have employed. These measures
are:
(1) Amplitude = maxt(biast/ ft)/mint(biast/ ft) , where pt and ft equal the
median transaction price and fundamental value in period t, respectively.
(2) NormalizedDeviation = ∑i |pi − fi|/TSU, where pi is the price of trans-
action i and fi is the fundamental value of the share at the time that transaction
i is executed. TSU is the total stock of units that agents hold.
(3) Turnover = ∑t qt/TSU, where qt is the quantity of units of the asset
exchanged in period t.
(4) BoomDuration = the greatest number of consecutive periods for which
pt > ft.
(5) BustDuration = the greatest number of consecutive periods for which
pt < ft.
In the table, the measures are reported for each market within each session,
averaged across sessions for each treatment, and between session standard
deviations.
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Table 3.8: Tests of Treatment Differences
Boom Bust Normalized
Market Amplitude Turnover Duration Duration Deviation N
1 0.465 0.917 0.248 0.502 0.347 10
2 0.465 0.402 0.600 0.381 0.117 10
3 0.465 0.173 0.092 0.827 0.028 10
4 0.347 0.347 0.112 0.747 0.028 10
All 0.788 0.330 0.868 0.194 0.065 30
Notes: Rank-sum tests of treatment differences in price discovery measures given in
Table 3.7. Reported value in rows 1-4 are the significance levels at which the hypotheses
of equal distributions across treatments can be rejected. Row 5 is the significance level
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Subject Instructions
Treatment-specific information is contained inside curly braces { } for the Peak treat-
ment and square brackets [ ] for sessions V3-V5 of the Valley treatment (information
for V1-V2 is omitted, as it is very similar to the information in V3-V5).
1. General Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading
Periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market.
The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be done in terms of
francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in Euros.
The conversion rate is: 200 francs to 1 Euro.
2. How to use the computerized market
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the
current Period. The goods that can be bought and sold in the market are called
Shares. In the center of your screen you see the current Period and the amount
of Money you have available to buy Shares. To the left of the screen, you see
the number of Shares you currently have. If you would like to offer to sell a
share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer to sell:“ in the second column. In
that text area you can enter the price at which you are offering to sell a share,
and then select “Submit Offer To Sell”.
Please do so now. Type in a number in the appropriate space, and then click
on the field labelled “Submit Offer To Sell”. You will notice that nine num-
bers, one submitted by each participant, now appear in the third column from
the left, entitled “Offers To Sell”. The lowest ask price will always be on the
bottom of that list and will, by default, be selected. You can select a different
offer by clicking on it. If you select “Buy”, the button at the bottom of this
column, you will buy one share for the currently selected sell price. Please
purchase a share now by selecting “Buy”. Since each of you had offered to sell
a share and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the
same number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one
share and sold one share.
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When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase.
When you sell a share, your Money increases by the price of the sale. You
may make an offer to buy a unit by selecting “Submit offer to buy.” Please do
so now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy.” Then press the
red button labelled “Submit Offer To Buy”. You can sell to the person who
submitted the highest offer to buy if you click on “Sell”. Please do so now.
In the middle column, labelled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at
which Shares have been bought and sold in this period.
You will now have 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a practice period.
Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and
do not influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the
practice period is to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you
have successfully submitted offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that
you have accepted buy and sell offers. You are free to ask questions during
the practice period by raising your hand.
3. Specific Instructions for this Experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, you are
permitted to buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods.
Your inventory of shares carries over from one period to the next. For exam-
ple, if you have 5 shares at the end of period 1, you will have 5 shares at the
beginning of period 2.
Dividends:
You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end of
each of the 15 trading periods. At the end of each trading period, including
period 15, the experimenter will roll a sixsided die. The outcome of the roll
will determine the dividend for the period. Each period, each share you hold
at the end of the period earns you a dividend of:
• 0 francs if the die reads 1
• 8 francs if the die reads 2
• 28 francs if the die reads 3
• 60 francs if the die reads 4
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If the roll is a “5” or “6”, the die is rolled again. Each of the numbers on the
die is equally likely. This means that the average dividend is 24. We arrive at
24 by averaging the four equally likely dividends: 0, 8, 28, and 60. That is, we
calculate (0 + 8 + 28 + 60)/4 = 24. The dividends you earn from shares you
own are automatically added to your money balance after each period.
[After dividends and taxes have been paid out at the end of period 15, the ex-
perimenter will purchase back all the shares in the market for 216 francs each
from their current owners. This buyout value will be added to any dividends
received in period 15.]
Holding Taxes:
At the end of the {first} [last] eight periods, you must pay a holding tax of 48
francs for each share in your inventory. That is, a tax is paid at the end of
{period 1, period 2, . . . , and period 8} [period 8, period 9, . . . , and period 15].
No tax is paid at the end of each of the {last} [first] seven periods ({period 8,
period 9, . . . , and period 15} [period 1, period 2, . . . , and period 7]). The taxes
you owe on shares are automatically subtracted from your money balance at
the end of each of the first [last] eight periods.
4. Average Holding Value Table
You can use the AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of
this document) to help you make decisions. It calculates the average amount
of dividends and holding taxes you will receive and pay if you keep a share
until the end of the experiment. It also describes how to calculate how much
in future dividends and holding taxes you give up on average when you sell
a share at any time.
1. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being
calculated. For example, in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding
to “Current Period 1” are in effect.
2. Number of Remaining Dividends: the number of times that a dividend can
be received from the current period until the final period. That is, it indicates
the number of die rolls remaining in the lifetime of the asset. It is calculated by
taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period number,
and adding 1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period.
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3. Average Dividend: the average amount of each dividend. As we indicated
earlier, the average dividend in each period is 24 francs per share[, except for
the last period, which has an average dividend of 24 + 216 = 240 francs].
4. Average Remaining Dividends: the average value of all the dividends you
will receive for each share you hold from now until the end of the experiment.
It is calculated by multiplying Number of Remaining Dividends by Average
Dividend.
5. Number of Remaining Tax Payments: the number of times that a tax must
be paid on a share from the current period until the end of the experiment. It
is calculated by taking the total number of tax periods, 8, and subtracting the
number of tax periods that have already passed.
6. Tax Amount: the amount that the tax payment per share will be. As indi-
cated earlier, there is no tax in the {last} [first] 7 periods, while the tax amount
is 48 francs per share in the {first} [last] 8 periods.
7. Remaining Taxes: the total value of the taxes remaining on a share from
now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your
inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will pay the amount listed
in column 7 in holding taxes. It is calculated by multiplying Number of Re-
maining Tax Payments by Tax Amount.
8. Average Holding Value: the average value of holding a share for the re-
mainder of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory
for the remainder of the experiment, the difference between the dividends you
earn and the taxes you pay will on average be the amount listed here. It is cal-
culated by subtracting Remaining Taxes from Average Remaining Dividends.
Please have a look at this table now and make sure you understand it. Feel
free to raise your hand if you have a question. When you feel comfortable
with it, please go on and answer the following practice quiz:
PRACTICE QUIZ
1. Suppose it is period 10. How much will you pay in taxes on a share if you
hold it for the remainder of the experiment?
ANSWER:
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2. Suppose it is period 10. How much do you expect to receive in dividends
on a share if you hold it for the remainder of the experiment?
ANSWER:
3. Suppose it is period 10. What is the average value of holding a share for the
remainder of the experiment?
ANSWER:
5. Your Earnings
Your earnings for the experiment will equal the total amount of money that
you have at the end. More specifically, your earnings will be:
the money you begin with + any dividends you receive - any taxes you pay
+ any money you receive from sales of shares - any money you spend on
purchases of shares.
6. Beginning the experiment - From now on your decisions will count toward
your earnings, so please think carefully before making them.





























































































































































































































































































FIRM INTERVENTIONS: SHARE ISSUES AND SHARE
REPURCHASES 1
This chapter looks at share repurchases and share issues in bubble markets.
Although the intrinsic value of the shares is independent of the quantity out-
standing, the interventions result in changes in asset price. The findings are
that: (1) A repurchase of shares increases the price of the asset, and a share
issue decreases the price of the asset, compared to a benchmark of no inter-
vention. The effects are consistent with the capital structure puzzle, a nega-
tive correlation that is typically observed between the price and the supply
of shares of stock. (2) The empirical patterns observed are consistent with a
model proposed by De Long et al. (1990), which posits three trader types–
fundamental, speculator, and momentum– interacting in the market. (3) The
downward pressure on prices resulting from share issues drives prices down
toward, but not beyond, fundamental values. This downward resistance at
the fundamental value appears to arise from the impact of an intervention on
the proportion of the total stock of units and cash held by each trader type.
4.1 Introduction
There is considerable evidence that market interventions in the form of share
issues or repurchases can affect asset prices. On average, the price of a stock
1This chapter is based on Haruvy et al. (2010).
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falls after a firm announces a share issue (Grinblatt and Hwang (1989); Ritter
(1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995))2, while
repurchase announcements are typically followed by increases in share prices
(Masulis (1980); Vermaelen (1981); Bartov (1991); Grullon and Michaely (2004);
Lie (2005))3. This phenomenon is referred to as the capital structure puzzle
(Stigler (1964); Myers (1984)). However, such interventions are typically not
exogenous, and the resulting price changes can usually be explained by the
claim that the interventions either affect the fundamental value of the stock,
or influence investors’ beliefs about fundamentals. This would be the case,
for example, if the choice to intervene was indicative of capital structure op-
timization, signaling, insider knowledge or executive compensation schemes
(Mintz (1987); Lowenstein (1991); Bagnoli et al. (1989); Dittmar (2000); Brav
et al. (2005); Bhattacharya (1979); Miller and Rock (1985); Vermaelen (1981),
Vermaelen (1984)).
On the other hand, it has been proposed that changes in the supply of
shares can affect stock prices solely because some traders value the shares
more than others. Thus, the greater is the supply of shares; the lower is the
valuation of the marginal shareholder. This would be the case even in settings,
in which the quantity of shares does not affect their fundamental value. There
is evidence consistent with this notion. Shleifer (1986) finds that stocks trade
at higher prices in the first ten days after their inclusion in the S&P500 than in
the next ten days, suggesting that buyers with higher valuations purchase the
stock first and others with lower valuations follow. Similar conclusions have
been reached by other authors (Scholes (1972), Mikkelson and Partch (1985),
Kaul et al. (2000), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), Lynch and Mendenhall
(1997)), who all interpret their results as consistent with the existence of a
portion of investors who have higher marginal values than others. If this is
2A particularly striking recent example of this phenomenon is the recent US government
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. The companies faced an urgent
need for liquidity to meet short term debt obligations, and attempted to float a large number
of new shares. However, the act of doing so had such a large negative effect on prices that
the firms’ market capitalization fell dramatically. This exacerbated their liquidity crisis and
precipitated the nationalization of the two companies.
3Typically, there is a spike in share price immediately following the repurchase announce-
ment (Masulis (1980)). However, Lie (2005) finds that firms that merely announce a repur-
chase program without actually repurchasing shares are less likely to experience a subsequent
performance improvement, whereas firms that follow through on their announcements con-
tinue to experience large performance improvements within two quarters, persisting for at
least two years thereafter. Grullon and Michaely (2004) find increases only in the year of the
announcement and not in subsequent years.
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the case, share repurchases would increase, and share issues would decrease,
prices, even if they do not affect fundamentals or beliefs.
In the research reported here, the experimental method is used to investi-
gate how this latter effect might operate4. To do so, all of the factors that might
allow a share repurchase or issue to affect the fundamental value are stripped
away while the properties of the market response to an exogenous interven-
tion are studied. The markets used here are for assets whose fundamental
value is independent of the total supply of shares. The supply of shares of the
asset then varies exogenously with share repurchases and share issues. While
the repurchase or share issue has no effect on the intrinsic value of the as-
set5, the intervention does affect the environment in ways that, coupled with
boundedly rational trader behavior, may well change outcomes. A share is-
sue or a repurchase changes the supply of shares relative to the cash available
for purchases by traders6. In addition, it may change the allocation of shares
among individuals, and thereby affect the weight or influence that traders of
different types or using different strategies exert on market activity. These
effects may lead the market to exhibit a price response to an intervention.
Three specific issues are considered. The first is whether repurchases and
share issues affect price level in a setting in which they can have no impact
on an asset’s intrinsic value. The second is whether either of the interventions
leads to pricing of the asset closer to its intrinsic value. The third is whether
the price patterns are consistent with a particular theoretical model, proposed
4Experimentally, capital structure considerations have been investigated regarding in-
vestors’ myopic attitudes to bond and stock payoff streams (e.g., Gneezy and Potters (1997);
Eriksen and Kvaloy (2009)) as well as to differential ability of equity and debt auctions (for
venture capital funding) to result in efficient outcomes in the presence of asymmetric pri-
vate information (Kogan and Morgan (2009)). In this investigation, in contrast, a two-sided
market trading of one asset class is studied, with information regarding fundamental values
commonly known and the analysis focused on relative demand and supply effects in asset
trading.
5Another way to introduce shares to the market in a revenue neutral manner is through a
share split. A share split simply replaces each share held by investors with a fixed number of
shares greater than one. The idea behind such a conversion is to increase share liquidity when
individual share units are deemed too expensive for some investors. At least in principle, this
action could relax constraints on purchases by cash- strapped traders in later stages of the
experiments. Additional sessions, not reported here, and found that investors quickly made
full adjustments for share splits.
6See Caginalp et al. (1998) for a discussion of the effect of varying cash levels on bubble
magnitudes. They observe a 0.14− 0.29 correlation between price levels and the amount of
cash per share, suggesting that prices increase by around 20 currency units for every 100
currency units per share added to the market.
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by De Long et al. (1990) and applied to experimental data by Haruvy and
Noussair (2006) (hereafter HN). In the model, each trader in the market is
classified as belonging to one of three possible types. The three types are (1)
fundamental value traders, who purchase and sell based on differences be-
tween price and fundamentals, (2) rational speculators, who anticipate and
trade on future price movements, and (3) momentum traders, who trade as if
they believe that previous price trends will continue.
Specifically, the fundamental value traders increase their holdings when
prices are below fundamentals and decrease their holdings when prices are
above fundamentals. Fundamental value traders thus behave like rational
agents in classical models, who assume that the rationality of all traders is
common knowledge. The momentum traders follow historical trends, increas-
ing their holdings when prices have been increasing in the recent past and re-
ducing them when prices have been declining. The rational speculator accu-
mulates holdings before prices increase and reduces holdings before prices de-
crease, while ignoring the difference between prices and fundamentals. These
traders are rational, have correct short-term expectations about future prices,
and recognize that prices will not necessarily follow fundamentals. Rational
speculators are similar to the rational arbitrageurs of Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003) (hereafter AB) in that they try to ”ride” the bubble. However, the ratio-
nal speculators have more accurate beliefs. Rational arbitrageurs in AB have
diverse opinions (also see Morris (1996)) about the exact timing of the bubble
and these differences result in a lack of synchronization and the persistence of
the bubble. In contrast, rational speculators in the model presented here have
identical and correct beliefs about future prices7.
Three empirical patterns that emerge from the simulations serve as the hy-
potheses for the experiment. These are the following: (1) Repurchases increase
prices, while share issues reduce prices. (2) Asset prices are closer to funda-
7A similar model with three trader types was applied to experimental data by Caginalp
and Ilieva (2008) (hereafter CI). In the CI model, traders were classified into momentum
traders, fundamental value traders, and neutral traders. The first two types correspond to
the types of the same name discussed above. The neutral trader is essentially a catch-all cate-
gory for those traders that could not be classified as the first two types. Rational speculators
were not assigned a separate category. There are also two main implementation issues that
differ between the HN and CI models. The first is that the HN classification looks at a trader’s
executed trades whereas CI classifies according to offers to buy and sell. The second is that
HN classify a trader as belonging to the same type throughout the life of the asset, whereas CI
allows a trader to switch type in each period. Each method comes with advantages and dis-
advantages but the HN classification permits simple simulations along the lines of De Long
et al. (1990), and this is an important component of the research strategy used here.
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mentals after a share issue, and they are farther away from fundamentals after
a repurchase than they would have been in the absence of an intervention. (3)
A repurchase reduces the fundamental value traders’ proportion of the market
power, as measured by an index weighting the proportion of the total stock
of shares and cash they hold. In contrast, they have a higher proportion of
the market power after a new share issue. In the simulations, the greater mar-
ket power of fundamental value traders after a share issue appears to be the
reason that prices track fundamentals more closely after a share issue.
The results of the experiment are presented in section 4.4. The three pat-
terns described above are found to appear prominently in the data. (1) Prices
are greater after a repurchase than after a share issue. (2) The absolute differ-
ence between prices and fundamentals is greater after a repurchase than after
a share issue. (3) The interventions alter the weight that fundamental value
traders have in the market. A repurchase reduces the market power of funda-
mental value types, while a share issue does the opposite. The greater weight
that fundamental value traders have after a share issue appears to account for
the strong tendency for prices to closely track fundamentals after the share is-
sue. This conjecture is supported with additional simulations of interventions
of different sizes in section 4.4.3.
4.2 Hypotheses
Consider a non-exhaustive classification of traders based on De Long et al.
(1990) and applied to experimental data by Haruvy and Noussair (2006). The
classification system consists of the following three types of traders:
1. Fundamental Value Traders (FV): These traders increase (decrease) share
holdings when median price is below (above) fundamental value8.
2. Momentum Traders (MM): These traders increase (decrease) share hold-
ings in response to an upward (downward) price trend in the recent past.
3. Rational Speculators (RA): These traders correctly anticipate the next pe-
riod’s price movement. If the price move is upward (downward), they
increase (decrease) holdings of shares.
The simulation model has the following features. The demand function of
the momentum traders in period t is of the form −δ + β(pt−1 − pt−2), where pt
8De Long et al. (1990) and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) referred to this type of trader as a
Passive Trader. However, for clarity, the term Fundamental Value trader (FV) is employed here.
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is the average transaction prices in periods t, and δ and β are parameters. The
demand function of the fundamental value traders is −α(pt − ft). Finally, the
rational speculator, who has demand given by γ(E(pt+1)− pt), trades based on
the difference between the expected price in the next period and the current
spot price. It is assumed that speculators have correct expectations of the next
period’s price, and thus E(pt+1) = pt+1. The simulation thus has four demand
parameters denoted by δ, β, α, and γ.
The simulations presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which are used as the
basis for the null hypotheses for the experiment, assume the parameter values
and proportions of trader types estimated in Haruvy and Noussair (2006).
The parameter values were estimated by minimizing the distance between
the simulated price patterns and actual data in their experiment9. The values
are α = 0.75, β = 0.13, γ = 0.55, and δ = 0.48. The proportions of trader
types are 0.33, 0.42, and 0.25, for fundamental value, momentum and rational
speculators respectively.
Each set of market simulations includes 150 repetitions, or 150 groups of
nine simulated traders. Traders are drawn at random from the three types
with a probability corresponding to their assumed proportions. Each trader
begins period 1 with the initial endowment of money and shares allocated to
him in the current experiment. Next, there is a grid search on prices in each
period. Prices are determined by setting net demand equal to zero (equating
demand and supply). The price is adjusted until the net excess demand equals
zero. We solve for period prices one by one, proceeding sequentially. There
are two iterations through the 15 periods to solve for prices. The first iteration
determines the beliefs of the speculators; the second iteration solves for the
actual prices. The figures show the average over the 150 simulated markets10.
9Haruvy and Noussair (2006) assume that their markets are characterized by the interac-
tion of the three types postulated by DeLong et al. (1990). They find that the model can explain
the price patterns emerging from the relaxation of short selling constraints, as well as price
patterns following the infusion of cash into the market. Specifically, they study conditions
where traders could sell stocks short under different short-sale and cash reserve constraints.
They also study conditions where cash in the system is multiplied by 10 over baseline levels.
In general, loosening of short selling constraints lowers prices and increasing cash balances
raises prices.
10Periods 1 and 2 are fixed at empirical values (the actual average values observed in the
experimental treatment that is simulated). The price in period 15 is assumed to be 24, the
period 15 fundamental value. These restrictions are necessary because the momentum types
take prices in the two prior periods as exogenous and the rational speculator type takes the
price one period ahead as exogenous.
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Figure 4.1 shows the results of simulations of the market price patterns for
the three treatments. The vertical axis indicates the price level and the hor-
izontal axis the market period. The Benchmark treatment produces a bub-
ble lasting from period 4 until period 7. The Share Issue treatment shows a
decrease in price at the time of the intervention in period 6 to below funda-
mental values, but tracks fundamentals closely afterwards. The Repurchase
treatment exhibits an acceleration of the bubble at the time of the intervention,
and a market crash beginning in period 10. The figure shows that the model
produces the price patterns associated with the Capital Structure Puzzle. A
share issue lowers prices whereas a repurchase increases prices, compared to
the levels at which they would have been in the absence of the intervention.
Figure 4.1: Simulation Prices
The first hypothesis is that share repurchases increase prices and share is-
sues lower prices, relative to the Benchmark treatment.
Hypothesis 6 Repurchases lead to higher prices, and share issues lead to lower prices,
than would have existed in the absence of the intervention.
Another pattern that appears in Figure 4.1 is that the treatments differ in
how far prices diverge from fundamentals. The figure suggests that pricing
is on average closer to fundamental values in the Share Issue treatment than
in the Benchmark treatment, which is in turn closer than in the Repurchase
treatment.
Hypothesis 7 The share issue moves prices closer to fundamental value, while the
repurchase moves prices farther away from fundamentals, then they would be in the
absence of an intervention.
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The simulations suggest that in the Share Issue treatment, prices tend to
track fundamental values fairly closely. Closer inspection of the allocation
of cash and share inventories held by individuals of each type suggests that
this pattern appears to be related to the fact that an intervention exerts an
effect on the relative market influence of the three trader types. If a share
issue shifts influence away from momentum traders and toward fundamental
value traders, this provides a plausible account for the ability of the share issue
to reduce mispricing. If the opposite effects occur after a share repurchase,
that momentum traders gain influence and fundamental value traders lose
influence, this would provide an account of how the share repurchase could
exacerbate the bubble. Consider the following measure of the market power








where st and ct indicate total shares and cash in period t, respectively. Each
trader i begins each period t with inventories of shares si,t−1 and cash ci,t−1.
These inventories are also equal to the shares and cash that player i holds at
the end of period t− 1, after the dividend for period t− 1 has been paid. The
measure is a convex combination of subject i’s relative share of the total cash
and stock available in the period, with equal weight on each dimension. This
measure is used to study whether differences in price paths between treat-
ments can be explained by a reallocation of market influence among trader
types as a consequence of an intervention.
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Figure 4.2: Simulated Market Power
(a) Benchmark (b) Share Issue
(c) Share Repurchase
Figures 4.2a - c illustrate the evolution of market power of the three types
of trader in each of the three sets of simulations. The vertical axis indicates
the total market power of all agents of each type, and the horizontal axis is
the market period. To understand the patterns, recall the dynamics of the
typical bubble price pattern as displayed in Figure 4.1. Also bear in mind that
purchases at low prices and sales at high prices increase a trader’s relative
market power.
In the early periods of each treatment, momentum traders tend to increase
their market power as they purchase shares aggressively at low prices. In
the Benchmark treatment, however, after a bubble forms, the MM traders
make purchases from fundamental value traders at high prices, reducing their
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power, while increasing the power of FV traders. As prices fall and the mar-
ket operates near fundamentals for the remainder of the life of the asset, FV
traders steadily accumulate market power, since they only make trades that
are profitable on average.
In the Repurchase treatment, the intervention increases the market power
of MM traders and decreases that of FV traders as a large bubble forms. At
the time of the intervention, the fundamental value traders quickly run out
of shares and prices continue to rise in response to the demand generated by
the repurchase. The momentum traders, however, hold out for higher prices
and thus sell to the experimenter near the top of the bubble, increasing their
market power. However, after the intervention is completed, the MM traders
return to making unprofitable purchases at high prices, leading to a reduction
in their market power.
Under a Share Issue, the intervention causes an increase in the market
power of FV traders and a decrease in that of MMs. The intervention sup-
plies new shares to the market, lowering the market price to a level below
fundamentals. The FV traders purchase the bulk of these units, and do so at
favorable prices. RA traders also purchase some of the units as they antici-
pate the subsequent increase in price to fundamentals, but MM traders miss
out on the bargain. These shares generate cash dividends, so the fundamen-
tal value traders have large and increasing quantities of both cash and shares
to keep the market from deviating too far from fundamentals for the remain-
der of the life of the asset. As the market operates close to fundamentals,
FV traders steadily accumulate market power by receiving dividends and by
taking advantage of small price fluctuations. Hypothesis 8 posits that in the
experiment, the share of the market power of fundamental value traders will
exhibit similar differences between treatments as in the simulations.
Hypothesis 8 Over the life of the asset, the average market power of Fundamental
Value traders is lowest under the Repurchase treatment. The Market Power of Fun-
damental Value traders is greatest under the Share Issue treatment.
4.3 Experimental Design
The design consists of three treatments (based on the general design described
in 2.4: a Benchmark treatment in which no external intervention takes place, a
Repurchase treatment where a share repurchase occurs, and a Share Issue treat-
ment where additional shares are sold into the market. In the Repurchase
CHAPTER 4 69
treatment, an intervention occurs at time t∗ in which one half of ∑ si,t∗, the
total stock of units that all traders hold, is purchased. In the Share Issue treat-
ment, an intervention occurs at time t∗ as well, when one half of ∑ si,t∗ ad-
ditional shares are sold to traders. Thus the Repurchase and the Share Issue
represent interventions of equal size.
The subjects know that an intervention will occur in some future period
but do not know the period t∗ in which this intervention will happen. Prior
knowledge of t∗ would have permitted coordination by subjects, thus funda-
mentally changing the nature of the market. For example, Abreu and Brunner-
meier (2003) argue that news events at a defined future point make it possible
for rational speculators to synchronize their exit strategies.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the parameter choices for the experiment11.
The implementation of the interventions operated as follows. In period t∗,
an intervention occurred in the Share Issue and Repurchase treatments, but
not in the Benchmark treatment. In the Share Issue (Repurchase) intervention,
the computerized firm received a trading requirement that involved selling
(buying) a certain number of shares to (from) the market. The computerized
firm then participated in the market until its target had been achieved12. To
achieve its target, the computerized firm periodically checked whether the
bid-ask spread was above or below a certain threshold. If the bid-ask spread
was above the threshold, the firm placed a new offer to sell (buy) for one unit
that was lower (higher) than the current best standing offer to sell (buy) by
the amount of some threshold. Otherwise the firm accepted the best standing
offer to buy (sell). The parametric structure of the markets and interventions
is summarized in Table 4.1.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Price Patterns
The dataset consists of six sessions conducted under each treatment, for a to-
tal of 18 sessions13. Four sessions of each treatment were conducted at Tilburg
11These were identical to those used in Smith et al. (1988) for their “design 4” parameteri-
zation, but with initial endowments of shares of each individual doubled.
12This is similar in spirit to Veiga and Vorsatz (2009), who study the effects of a similar
uninformed trading rule on price discovery.
13Two sessions only included 8 subjects. For these sessions one less subject was assigned as
a Type 2 agent, so that on average the number of initial shares and cash per subject was the
same across all sessions.
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Table 4.1: Design Parameters
Parameter Value
Period length 240 seconds
Initial portfolios (shares, cash)
(6, 450); (4, 1170); (2, 1890)
Exchange rate 170 francs = 1 Euro or
150 francs = 1 US dollar.
Length of time 5 seconds
between firm actions
Intervention size 50% of outstanding shares
Bid-ask spread threshold 10 francs
Time of intervention start, t* Beginning of Period 6
university, and two at the University of Texas at Dallas. Subjects were re-
cruited via an online system and through posters and announcements. On
average, the sessions lasted 2 hours.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the median transaction price by period in each session,
along with the fundamental value. Each of panels (a)-(c) corresponds to one of
the treatments. Within each panel, one time series represents the fundamental
value and the others each represent prices in one session. Panel (d) presents
the averages over the six sessions of each treatment.
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Figure 4.3: Period Prices Relative to Fundamentals
(a) Benchmark (b) Issues
(c) Repurchases (d) Treatment Averages
Notes: Treatment averages are the average over all sessions of a treatment. The
prices in periods 7-9 of session R4 are 1200, 1130, and 1207.
We first consider whether Hypotheses 6 and 7 are supported. The figures
above show that prices are higher in the Repurchase treatment than in the
Benchmark treatment. In turn, they are higher in the Benchmark treatment
than under Share Issue. Furthermore, in the Repurchase and Benchmark treat-
ments, prices are substantially greater than fundamentals for most of the trad-
ing horizon. Bias, a measure of the overall price level, is used to formally test
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Table 4.2: Treatment Averages of Mispricing Measures
Measure of Mispricing Repurchase Benchmark Share Issue
Bias 1596 196 -519
Dispersion 2795 2032 698
Bias, 3102 1421 -165
periods 6 to 15
Dispersion, 3228 1897 363
periods 6 to 15
Table 4.3: Hypothesis test results: p-values
Hypothesis Repurchase vs. Benchmark vs. Repurchase vs.
Benchmark Share Issue Share Issue
H1, Bias 0.485 0.310 0.015**
H2, Dispersion 0.394 0.015** 0.009**
H3, Market Power 0.643 0.114 0.049**
of FV traders
the hypothesis. Table 4.2 below indicates the Bias averaged over all sessions
of each treatment, as well as the subset of periods 6 - 15 only, the time after
which the intervention has taken place.
The p-values resulting from rank-sum tests of the hypotheses (taking each
session in its entirety as an observation) are shown in Table 4.3. Bias is signif-
icantly different at the 5% level between the Repurchase and the Share Issue
treatments (p-value=0.015), while neither of the two treatments is significantly
different from the Benchmark treatment. The significance of the difference be-
tween prices under the two different interventions, coupled with the fact that
all pair-wise treatment differences observed are in the direction predicted by
the hypothesis (see Table 4.2, leads to the conclusion that the hypothesis is
supported.
A similar pattern is observed in Table 4.3 with respect to aggregate mispric-
ing as measured by Dispersion. The ranking of treatment averages follows
the same pattern as it did for Bias. Specifically, Repurchase sessions have the
highest magnitude of mispricing relative to fundamentals, followed by Bench-
mark, and then Share Issue. Table 4.3 reports that two of the three differences
between treatments are highly significant (p < 0.015), providing strong sup-
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Notes: The sign of the change in share holdings is the same
as the signal sign.
port for Hypothesis 7.
4.4.2 Market Power
Now consider how the interventions affect the market power that each type
holds. In order to classify subjects, subjects are first assigned a period score
that measures how well a subject’s behavior in each period coincides with how
each of the three theoretical trader types would have behaved (see Table 4.4
below). Then period scores are summed to get an aggregate measure of how
well a subject’s behavior coincides with each of the three types over the span
of the entire market. He is then classified as belonging to the type for which he
has the highest score, provided that he satisfies the condition corresponding
to the type in at least 50% of all periods in the session. Those individuals not
fitting any of the three types are classified as “other”.
The first row of Figure 4.4 presents the average market power over time
of an individual of each of the three different trader types, while the second
shows market power for an individual of each trader type averaged over all
sessions of a treatment. Turning first to the effect of an intervention in period
6, we find that the average FV type has more market power after a share issue
than after a repurchase, and vice-versa for RA types. MMs also acquire con-
siderably more market power in the latter periods of the Repurchase sessions.
Thus it appears that the interventions have the effect of transferring market
power to or away from FV types.
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Figure 4.4: Market Power per Subject
Notes: Vertical bars indicate beginning of interventions.
Table 4.5 shows the average number of individuals in a market that are
classified as belonging to each of the three types, by treatment. It shows that in
the Repurchase treatment, more individuals are MM traders than in the other
treatments. On the other hand, there are fewer FV traders in the Repurchase
than in the other treatments. There are also more individuals classified as
FV traders in the Share Issue than in the other treatments. Thus Hypothesis 8
receives strong support. More individuals act as FV traders in Share Issue than
in Benchmark, and fewer act as FV traders in Repurchase than in benchmark.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 4.3, the average FV trader has significantly
more market power in the Share Issue than in the Repurchase treatment.
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Table 4.5: Number of Traders by Type
Type Repurchase Benchmark Share Issue
Rational 2.28 1.94 2.03
Momentum 3.86 2.94 2.53
Fundamental 2.53 3.28 4.11
Notes: Number of traders of each type, averaged over all
sessions of a treatment.
4.4.3 Interventions of Different Sizes
Now consider the potential effect of interventions of different sizes, with a
focus on how robust the downward resistance of prices at fundamentals is to
larger share issues. The results of simulations of several scenarios are given
in Figure 4.5. In addition to simulations of the interventions conducted in the
experiment, the figure contains average price paths resulting from buybacks
of 75% of the total stock of units, as well as from share issues of 100% and
1000% of the initial stock of units14.
The figure shows that a larger buyback creates a larger bubble, both in mag-
nitude and duration. Comparison of the 75% and the 50% repurchases reveal
a similar pattern in period 6 but higher prices thereafter under a larger repur-
chase. The larger share issues flood the market in periods 6, but the market
tracks fundamental value closely afterward. Both cause the price to decrease
in period 6, rebound in period 7, and then track fundamentals closely from
period 8 onward. This indicates that the downward resistance of prices at
fundamental values following a share issue is strong, even in the face of very
large issues.
14In the simulations of share issues the entire supply of units can be and is sold in period
6, because there is a sufficient amount of disposable cash held by agents to purchase many
units at very low prices. In the simulations of repurchases, it may take multiple periods
for the intervention to be completed. A cash constraint for the repurchasing firm at 10,000
currency units per period is imposed in the simulations and the constraint is typically binding
in periods 6 and 7. In the experiment, because of the 5-second interval between the submission
of one of the firm’s bids and the next, a constraint limiting the speed of completion of the
intervention exists. The time available in period 6 sometimes expires before the experimenter
has completed his intervention.
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Figure 4.5: Simulated prices for additional interventions
Notes: Repurchases are for 50% and 75%, and share issues for 50%, 100% and
1000%, of the shares outstanding at the beginning of period 6.
4.5 Conclusion
In these experimental markets, repurchases and share issues are observed to
have an impact on price levels, quite apart from any informational content
they may provide to the market. The price effects of the interventions are
found to be largely explained by a model of traders who follow particular
momentum, rational, and fundamental trading strategies. The experimental
results support the predictions from a simulation model that repurchases tend
to remove power from traders who use fundamental values as a limit price,
whereas share issues tend to concentrate power in the hands of fundamen-
tal value traders. This reallocation of weight to fundamental value traders
that accompanies a share issue appears to move market prices closer to fun-
damentals. Further simulation results show a strong asymmetry between the
two types of interventions.
Such findings are consistent with the evidence from empirical finance that
asset demand is downward-sloping. During the dot com bubble of the late
1990s, there were stocks trading at what appeared to be extreme price-to-
earnings multiples and investors lamented their inability to capitalize on these
sure opportunities due to the constraints inherent in short selling (Ofek and
Richardson (2003)). Furthermore, the effects of demand and supply of assets
are apparent in other asset classes, including real estate (Lin and Yung (2006)),
junk bonds (Kaplan and Stein (1993)), and emerging economies’ debt (Krug-
man (1995)). It is clear how such markets might form bubbles as a result of
demand-and-supply imbalances. It should thus not be surprising then that
these factors play a role in stocks as well.
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Of course, experiments do not contain many important features of stock
markets, and the generality of the results hinges on how generic our envi-
ronment is. As other work in the literature points out, the consequences on
the firm’s debt-equity balance, information signals, and tax positions of share-
holders, are non-negligible. For example, knowing that issuing new shares
lowers prices of all shares, firms would not pursue such a strategy unless they
needed a new cash infusion to pursue a promising new investment or pay off
debt that the company deems too expensive. This insight would in turn make
new share issues non-neutral with respect to investor expectations of future
payoff streams. A similar argument could be made regarding share repur-
chases. The research presented here clarifies the understanding of interven-
tions by showing that they can still have a profound effect on relative demand
and supply in the market, even controlling for the other consequences they
might have on intrinsic values or on the beliefs of traders.
Other evidence for downward-sloping demand has been offered by Haruvy
and Noussair (2006) with regard to short selling. In that work, short selling
constraints are shown to be an important factor in bubble magnitude (also see
F. et al. (1993)). Introducing a sufficient number of additional shares to the
market through looser short selling restrictions created pricing below funda-
mentals. The short sellers tended to be the momentum traders and the rational
speculators. In contrast, the increase in shares implemented here through the
share issues results in the allocation of those shares primarily to the funda-
mental value traders. This helps to reduce mispricing rather than to increase
it, as in the case of short selling.
Because of the change in the allocation of shares among types resulting
from the two types of intervention, it appears that a larger repurchase would
serve to persistently increase prices even more than in this experiment. De-
mand from momentum traders and rational speculators would be further en-
couraged, even as fundamental value traders, who would wish to sell, would
run out of their units more quickly. On the other hand, a larger issue would
not lower prices beyond fundamentals, at least not for longer than a period
or two. The units the experimenter sells would be purchased primarily by the
passive traders. This means that at the time of the intervention, fundamental
traders would have more cash to buy units and would do so. This means that
fundamental value traders would have a greater percentage of the shares after
the issue, encouraging prices to track fundamentals even more closely. This is
because they would have a greater ability to exploit any deviations from fun-
damentals in a manner that would push prices back toward intrinsic values.
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Thus, our model predicts an asymmetry in the sense that relative to bench-
mark levels, prices will be pushed up more by a large repurchase of shares






This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might
earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at
the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading
Periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market.
The currency used in the market is francs. All trading will be done in terms of
francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in euros.
The conversion rate is: 170 francs to 1 euro.
2. How to use the computerized market
In the top right hand corner of the screen you see how much time is left in the
current trading Period. The goods that can be bought and sold in the market
are called Shares. In the center of your screen you see the number of Shares
you currently have and the amount of Money (francs) you have available to
buy Shares.
If you would like to offer to sell a share, use the text area entitled “Enter offer
to sell” in the first column. In that text area you can enter the price at which
you are offering to sell a share, and then select “Submit Offer To Sell”. Please
do so now. Type a number in the appropriate space, and then click on the
field labeled “Submit Offer To Sell”. You will notice that nine numbers, one
submitted by each participant, now appear in the second column from the left,
entitled “Offers To Sell”. Your offer is listed in blue. Submitting a second offer
will replace your previous offer.
The lowest offer-to-sell price will always be on the bottom of that list. You
can select an offer by clicking on it. It will then be highlighted. If you select
“Buy”, the button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share for the
currently selected sell price. Please purchase a share now by selecting an offer
and clicking the “Buy” button. Since each of you had offered to sell a share
and attempted to buy a share, if all were successful, you all have the same
80 STUDY: FIRM INTERVENTIONS
number of shares you started out with. This is because you bought one share
and sold one share. Please note that if you have an offer selected and the offer
gets changed, it will become deselected if the offer became worse for you. If
the offer gets better, it will remain selected.
When you buy a share, your Money decreases by the price of the purchase.
When you sell a share your Money increases by the price of the sale. You may
make an offer to buy a unit by selecting “Submit Offer To Buy.” Please do so
now. Type a number in the text area “Enter offer to buy”, then press the red
button labeled “Submit Offer To Buy”. You can replace your offer-to-buy by
submitting a new offer. You can accept any of the offers-to-buy by selecting
the offer and then clicking on the “Sell” button. Please do so now.
In the middle column, labeled “Transaction Prices”, you can see the prices at
which Shares have been bought and sold in this period. You will now have
about 10 minutes to buy and sell shares. This is a practice period. Your actions
in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and do not influence
your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the practice period is
to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you have successfully
submitted offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you have accepted
buy and sell offers. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the
experimenter will come by and assist you.
3. Specific Instructions for this experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods. In each period, there will
be a market open for 4 minutes, in which you may buy and sell shares. Shares
are assets with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of shares carries over
from one trading period to the next. You may receive dividends for each share
in your inventory at the end of each of the 15 trading periods.
At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the computer will
randomly determine the dividend value for all shares in that period. Each
period, each share you hold at the end of the period:
earns you a dividend of 0 francs with probability 1/4
earns you a dividend of 8 francs with probability 1/4
earns you a dividend of 28 francs with probability 1/4
earns you a dividend of 60 francs with probability 1/4
Each of the four dividend values is equally likely, thus the average dividend
in each period is 24. Dividends are added to your cash balance automatically.
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After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15, there will be no further
earnings possible from shares.
————— Insert only for Repurchase Treatment ———————————
4. Share Buyback
Over the course of the 15 periods, the computer will buy back half of the shares
from the market. It will do so by submitting offers to buy shares. These offers
will look and work exactly the same as offers created by other subjects. They
will be listed under the “Offers to Buy” column and they can be accepted by
using the “Sell” button. Once the computer has purchased back half of the
shares, it will no longer participate in the market.
—————Insert only for Share issue Treatment ————————————
4. Share Sale
Over the course of the 15 periods, the computer will sell a number of shares on
the market. The number of shares will equal half of the existing shares in the
market. It will do so by submitting offers to sell shares. These offers will look
and work exactly the same as offers created by other subjects. They will be
listed under the “Offers to Sell” column and they can be accepted by using the
“Buy” button. Once the computer has sold all of its shares, it will no longer
participate in the market.
————– End of Insert ——————————————————————
5. Average Holding Value Table
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make
decisions. There are 5 columns in the table. The first column, labeled End-
ing Period, indicates the last trading period of the experiment. The second
column, labeled Current Period, indicates the period during which the aver-
age holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the number of
holding periods from the period in the second column until the end of the ex-
periment. The fourth column, labeled Average Dividend per Period, gives the
average amount that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in
your inventory. The fifth column, labeled Average Holding Value Per Unit of
Inventory, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory from
now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each share you hold for the
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Table 4.6: Average Holding Value
Number of Average
Current Remaining Average Remaining
Period Dividends Dividend Dividends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 15 24 360
2 14 24 336
3 13 24 312
4 12 24 288
5 11 24 264
6 10 24 240
7 9 24 216
8 8 24 192
9 7 24 168
10 6 24 144
11 5 24 120
12 4 24 96
13 3 24 72
14 2 24 48
15 1 24 24
remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average the amount listed in
column 5.
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend
on a Share has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance
of being 28 and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on
average 24 per period for each Share. If you hold a Share for the remaining 7
periods, the total dividend for the Share over the 7 periods is on average 7*24
= 168. Therefore, the total value of holding a Share over the 7 periods is on
average 168.
6. Your Earnings
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that
you have at the end of period 15, after the last dividend has been paid. The
amount of cash you will have is equal to:
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The cash (called “Money” on your screen) you have at the beginning of the
experiment
+ dividends you receive
+ money received from sales of shares
- money spent on purchases of shares





INFORMATION AND SUBJECT FOCUS
This chapter examines subject focus in experimental asset markets using eye-
tracking machines. First, changes in market performance (prices, trade vol-
ume) are related to subject focus, providing exploratory insights into how the
processing of information precipitates market changes. Second, models of as-
set market behavior describe and predict the interaction of different types of
traders in a market (De Long et al. (1990); Easley and O’Hara (1992)). This
study is the first to examine how the visual attention of subjects in an asset
market corresponds with the behavioral assumptions underlying the models.
Finally, the study allows for the identification of how attention correlates with
earnings, gender, and other subject characteristics.
5.1 Introduction
Of the five senses, vision may be the most important for modern humans. For
example, the information contained here is most likely to be seen, and not
heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. This is supported by the large fraction
of brain resources devoted to processing visual information (Carlson et al.
(2003)), and the extensive literature on how that part of the brain (the vi-
sual cortex) functions (see, for example, Bullier (2001) and Muggleton et al.
(2003). This suggests that when it comes to absorbing information about an
environment, vision plays a crucial role for humans and how they interact
with their world. Economics, as a social science, aims to provide simplified
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models about how this interaction takes place. Often these models contain
conjectures about how agents take decisions given the information they have
acquired from their environment. Economic analysis has tended to focus more
on the decisions themselves and less on the information acquisition process,
at least in part because studying information acquisition has been relatively
difficult to do. However, recent developments of unobtrusive eye-tracking
equipment mean that this is no longer the case.
Information absorption, in other words what subjects observe in their en-
vironment, is important because it gives additional insights into how subjects
make their decisions. In particular, it has the potential to help distinguish
between multiple theories that might predict similar behavior in a given en-
vironment. The immediate task for many studies is to predict and explain
behavior in a given research domain, in which case distinguishing between
competing theories that provide similar predictions is of minor importance.
However, once the broader task of predicting behavior outside of the imme-
diate experimental setting is considered, it becomes necessary to filter out the
good theories from the bad. It is in the support of this endeavor that eye-
tracking in particular, and neuroeconomics in general, play a role (Camerer
et al. (2005)).
The topic of information absorption has received an increasing amount of
attention in economics. Two popular methods for tracking information ac-
quisition are the use of mouse-tracking and eye-tracking systems. Mouse-
tracking has been used rather extensively in many applications (see Payne
et al. (1993) for a review). Recent examples in economics include applica-
tions to backward and forward induction (Johnson et al. (2002)), decision rules
in normal-form games (Costa-Gomes et al. (2001)) and beauty contest games
(Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)). The advantage of mouse-tracking is that
it is easy to implement (free code that can be added to any web page), while
the disadvantage is that cursor movement may only be roughly correlated
with what subjects are focusing their attention on.
The recent advent of affordable eye-tracking machines means that tracking
eye movements directly has become a possibility for many researchers. Eye-
tracking uses systems of cameras, typically mounted on the computer screen,
to monitor the size and gaze of subjects pupils. This allows for a much finer
examination of subject attention than the mouse-tracking system. A recent
example (Wang et al. (2009)) studies subject focus and pupil dilation in sender-
receiver games.
So how can information acquisition, and eye-tracking in particular, help
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with the understanding of asset markets? The answer, described more fully in
the sections that follow, is that it shows 1) how socio-demographic character-
istics influence information acquisition in a financial task, 2) how asset market
outcomes can be related back to the information that subjects actively monitor
from their environment, and 3) whether or not particular trading strategies are
based on accurate theoretical motivations. Additionally, models of asset mar-
ket behavior describe and predict the interaction of different types of traders
in a market (Back and Baruch (2007), De Long et al. (1990), Easley and O’Hara
(1992)). This study also examines the consistency between the information ab-
sorption and trading activities of subjects classified according to these models.
This study is then a first attempt to shed light on the information acquisition
process in the context of experimental bubble markets. The design involves
remotely monitoring the focus of subjects while they participate in a well-
studied asset market setting. The bubble market setting is used because there
exists a large literature of studies that use a similar framework, thus making
the results of this study easier to relate to existing findings on asset market
behavior. This allows for novel insights and suggestions as to how market
and subject behavior is related to the information that subjects absorb from a
bubble environment.
The results suggest that the addition of graphical elements to the interface,
including a significant portion of the screen dedicated to explaining expected
dividends, had little impact on performance. In combination with data on
earnings, this means it is not possible to refute the idea that uncertainty about
fundamentals drives the bubble creation process. Analysis of the eye-tracking
data shows that personal characteristics do not predict differences in informa-
tion absorption very well. Attention to dividends, independent of the level
of dividends, also appears to play a role in predicting future price changes.
Finally, the data show that there is some support for the 3-type model of
De Long et al. (1990).
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the hypotheses are incorporated
directly into the discussion of the chapter, and not seperately as in the other
study chapters.
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5.2 Experimental Design
Figure 5.1: Trading Interface
The trading screen, shown in Figure 5.1, is divided into seven areas of interest
that are labelled in Table 5.1. On the left is the trading area, which includes
areas for 1) buying shares (top), 2) selling shares (bottom) and 3) inventory
information (middle). The area associated with transactions is the upper-right
area of the screen that shows the history of transactions, both as 4) a graph and
5) a list. The final area to the bottom-right of the screen presents information
about dividends. It includes 6) a graph of the average expected returns over
the course of the market, as well as 7) specific textual information regarding
dividends, including information about the most recently received dividend.
The layout of the trading screen may potentially induce bias in subject be-
havior. If, for example, subjects are pre-disposed to focusing on elements in
the top-left of the screen, this may induce purchasing bias in the markets (since
the buying area is in the top left of the trading interface). Such a top-left bias
has been documented for web-page usage (see, for example, Rodden et al.
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inv Inventory of cash and shares.
pgr Graph of previous transaction prices for the entire market.
plis List of previous tranaction prices in the current period only.
dexp Graph of expected dividends for all periods.
dact Actual value of the most recent dividend.
(2008)). However, there does not appear to be a persistent top-left bias for all
visual tasks (see, for example, Tseng et al. (2009) for evidence of center bias,
and Hagenbeek and Van Strien (2002), for bottom-left/top-right biases). But
most importantly, all of the analysis done here deals with relative attention to
different screen elements, so that the base level of attention is not important.
For this reason the interface was simply designed to be as similar as possible
to those used in similar studies (e.g. Haruvy et al. (2010)), while still making
room for the visual elements.
The eye-tracking machines were calibrated during the middle of the train-
ing market. This was done to allow subjects to assume a natural posture in
front of the computer, while not directly interrupting any market activity that
would affect their final earnings. Only the market that determined earnings
was recorded. See Appendix A for more details on the calibration of the eye-
tracking machines.
5.3 Results
The dataset for this study consists of nine sessions of the market environ-
ment (described in Section 2.4). In each session, four subjects had their actions
recorded by eye-tracking devices1. In order to facilitate comparison, parame-
ter choices, shown in Table 5.2, were the same as those used in Chapter 4.
The analysis is divided into four parts. The first part shows that eye-tracking
does not change behavior. The second part discusses some of the broad pat-
terns in the data. The third part attempts to explain information absorption
1The lab has four eye-tracking machines. A few sessions had fewer than nine subjects. See
Appendix 4.A for details.
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Table 5.2: Design Parameters
Parameter Value
Period length 120 seconds
Exchange rate 170 francs = 1 Euro.
Initial portfolios (shares, cash)
(6, 450); (4, 1170); (2, 1890)
patterns, while the section concludes by looking at how subsequent behavior
is determined by previous information absorption.
5.3.1 Design Effects
This study differs from the design of Haruvy et al. (2010) in two major ways.
First, some subjects had their screen focus recorded. Secondly, graphical el-
ements were added to the interface. The effect of these design differences is
given below.
The first concern is whether subjects sitting at eye-tracking machines be-
haved differently than subjects sitting at normal trading terminals. The con-
clusive answer, stated below, is that there does not appear to be any difference
between the two types of subjects.
Result 5.1 Eye-tracking has no effect on subject behavior at the level of the individ-
ual.
Support for Result 5.1 : Consider the following regression:
yi = α + ∑
k
βk · Xi,k + γ · Di + εi,
where yi, a given measure of the behavior of subject i, is modeled as a function
of a set of controls Xi,k and a dummy variable Di that takes a value of unity if
a subject had their vision tracked. The session subscripts are suppressed for
clarity. The γ coefficient captures the effect that eye-tracking has on subject
behavior.
Table 5.3 presents estimates of γ for various measures of subject behavior.
In all cases, eye-tracking has a negligible effect on subject performance. This
finding is particularly strong since the parametric structure of the regression
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Table 5.3: Estimates of γ, the effect of eye-tracking on subject behavior
Earnings Trades Offers Share Holdings Money Holdings
Estimate -114.8 -6.2 -8.4 0.1 -70.7
Std. Dev. (342.0) (12.6) (16.2) (0.9) (223.8)
Notes: Estimates from fixed-effects regressions, including controls for subject
characteristics. Significance codes: 0 ’***’ 0.01 ’**’ 0.05 ’*’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1 . Standard errors in
parentheses under coefficient estimates. Significance tests are relative to 0, N = 77. See
Appendix for complete results.
model favors the finding of statistical significance relative to more conserva-
tive non-parametric tests. Therefore from the point of view of individual sub-
ject behavior, it does not appear that the changes to the experimental design
had an effect on market outcomes.
The next point of interest is whether the interface changes, viewed by all
participants, had an aggregate effect on the markets. In order to precisely
quantify the effect of the interface, a comparison is made between these mar-
kets and similar markets from a closely related study (specifically, the markets
from the Benchmark treatment in Haruvy et al. (2010)). The differences be-
tween the two sets of markets is that the markets in this study: 1) contained
graphical information, and 2) ran continuously without pauses between peri-
ods, and 3) presented on-screen information relating to the fundamental value
continuously throughout the experiment. The expected effect of the first two
changes is unclear, however one might expect that the last change, making the
information related to the fundamental value more prominent throughout the
experiment, could increase the price discovery of the market, as was found in
Lei and Vesely (2009).
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Figure 5.2: Period Prices Relative to Fundamentals










































Result 5.2 The new interface, which includes extra salient information regarding
dividends, does not have an overall effect on the level of price discovery.
Support for Result 5.2 The median transaction price in each period of the ses-
sions is presented in Figure 5.22. A typical pattern of mispricing is observed
in these markets. During the first few periods, prices tend to be consistently
lower than fundamentals. As the market progresses, prices tend to creep up-
wards while at the same time fundamentals decrease. Around period 5 or 6,
prices overshoot fundamentals, and a span of persistent over-pricing contin-
ues until period 12 or 13, at which point the bubble bursts and prices crash
back towards fundamentals. At a glance, these markets appear to not differ
substantially in their performance from previous work.
Levels of mispricing in these markets, as measured by bias, do not differ
significantly from comparable markets reported in Haruvy et al. (2010) (p >
0.3, Wilcoxon ranksum test). In addition, the typical price patterns are not
2Periods in which there were no transactions were not included in the analysis.
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Table 5.4: Screen focus and session outcomes, means and correlations
Variable Session Mean Earnings Corr. Bias Corr.
Trade volume 102 -0.41 -0.01
Earnings 2555 1.00 -0.36
buy 39% -0.60 0.53
sell 10% 0.07 0.12
inv 29% 0.17 -0.26
pgr 7% 0.41 -0.65
plis 3% 0.09 -0.11
dexp 5% -0.29 0.15
dact 6% 0.68 -0.16
Notes: Focus variables are averaged over all periods of a subject, and
then averaged over all subjects of a session. Other session values are
computed as averages of subject values for that session. Correlations
are between session-level values.
affected - prices tend to display under-pricing at the beginning of the market,
followed by significant over-pricing for a period of time in the middle of the
market, finally culminating in a crash to fundamentals near the end of the
market.
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The previous finding appears to be at odds with recent work by Lei and
Vesely (2009). The aforementioned authors find that market efficiency is sig-
nificantly increased when the fundamental value is made more salient to sub-
jects, whereas here it appears to have no effect. Why does the additional in-
formation in this study, provided in a seemingly poignant visual manner, not
appear to affect behavior, when it has such a strong effect in other work?
One possibility is that little attention was paid to the dividend sections of
the screen. Perhaps subjects are so intensely focused on immediate trading
possibilities that they have no time to look at information contained outside
of the immediate order book. The eye-tracking data, summarized in Table 5.4,
shows that this was not the case.
Subjects spent a little less than half of their time (column 1) looking at the
purchasing and selling controls of the display (39% and 10%, respectively). A
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substantial amount of time was also devoted to looking at inventory (29%),
but the remaining screen focus was devoted to price and dividend informa-
tion. In particular, the areas of the screen devoted to dividends received a
substantial amount of attention (11%) from subjects. Therefore it appears that
lack of attention cannot explain the discrepancy.
A second possibility is that it is the nature of the dividend information that
matters for price formation. It may be that the visual information presented in
the display here differs from the type of information that is gained by receiv-
ing dividends (as in Lei and Vesely). The correlation between average subject
earnings (determined exogenously by the dividend draws) and various ses-
sion measures are shown in column 2. The negative value shows that higher
dividends cause lower bias in these sessions. In the sense that higher divi-
dends are also more dividends, this finding is consistent with Lei and Vesely
who find that extra experience with dividends reduces market mispricing.
This is summarized in the following observation.
Observation 1 The ability of dividend information to mitigate price bubbles depends
on the type of experience subjects receive with dividends.
The last column of Table 5.4 shows that subjects pay less attention to the trad-
ing controls when earnings are higher. Instead, subjects tend to focus on his-
torical prices and information about fundamentals. In other words, subjects
like to sit back and count their money when times are good. Such a story is
supported by the fact that earnings and trade volume are strongly negatively
correlated. This effect of earnings on subject focus and market prices leads to
the following observation:
Observation 2 High prices are associated with less attention to previous trade in-
formation.
The correlation between average bias in a session and the percentage of time
subjects spent looking at various screen elements (given in column 3) shows
that subjects tend to focus their attention, unsurprisingly, on the buying sec-
tion of the screen during sessions with high prices.
What is surprising, however, is that this increased attention on the buying
controls does not come at the expense of the selling controls (which actually
receive slightly more attention as well), nor at the equal expense of all other
screen elements. Instead, it comes almost entirely at the expense of the his-
torical information on prices. Since historical price information is necessary
when following a momentum trading strategy, this suggests that it is even
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less likely for subjects to be following a momentum trading during periods of
over-pricing. In other words, bubbles may be more than simply the products
of speculators following momentum trading strategies in the market.
This stands in stark contrast to studies such as Caginalp et al. (2000) that
have found that momentum trading does a good job of explaining bubbles.
Perhaps substantial opportunity still exists for improving the understanding
of how bubbles work. For now, this is simply summarized in Observation 3:
Observation 3 Bubbles are not correlated with the aquisition of information associ-
ated with a momentum trading strategy.
5.3.3 Explaining subject focus
Having established that behavior in these markets is representative of behav-
ior in other experimental work and highlighted some of the key features of
the data, the analysis now turns to explaining subject focus in these markets.
Self-reported answers to the subject survey are used to predict vision patterns.
There is some evidence that personal characteristics, for example gender
(Charness and Gneezy (2007)) and ethnicity (Brown (2007)), have an effect on
financial investment decisions. In contrast, the analysis that follows shows
that very little of the differences in eye-tracking data is explained by differ-
ences in subject characteristics. This is summarized in Result 5.3:
Result 5.3 Subject characteristics are not important determinants of screen focus.
Support for Result 5.3 : In order to estimate the effect of subject characteris-
tics on screen focus, consider regressions of the form:
aoii = αi + Xiβ + εi,
where aoii is the absolute time that subject i spent looking at an area of interest
over the entire market, and Xi are the personal characteristics of the subject.
The β elements measure the effect of various subject characteristics on screen
focus.
Subject behavior, in terms of focus on screen elements, is remarkably sta-
ble over various types of characteristics (see Table 5.5 for estimates, Appendix
5.A for questionnaire details). Considering gender, the only statistically signif-
icant differences are that males spend less time looking at textual information
regarding fundamentals, instead focusing more time on textual information
regarding prices. Large differences do not appear to be driven by ethnicity,
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years of education, or experience with experiments or trading environments.
The only other strong effect appears to be the choice of major. Overall, busi-
ness students spent more time looking at screen elements. The most striking
difference appears to be related to dividends - business students spend sig-
nificantly more time looking at actual dividends, whereas students from eco-
nomics and other majors tend to focus more on expected dividends.
The previous analysis investigated whether average subject vision patterns
over an entire market could be explained by subject characteristics. The fol-
lowing explores whether such a relationship exists between period to period
variables.
Throughout the lifetime of the market, the value of subjects’ portfolios fluc-
tuates, both because of changes in the market price of shares and the size of
received dividends. A natural hypothesis in this setting is that the rate of
strategy search depends on previous subject performance. Particularly, sub-
jects who feel that their trading strategy has been more successful (due to a
recent increase in portfolio value) will be less likely to search for new infor-
mation, whereas those with poor performance will be more likely to increase
their examination of different screen elements in the hopes of improving their
trading strategy.
This hypothesis is tested by estimating the parameters of:
∆yi,t = αi + Xi,tβ + γ∆pvi,t−1 + εi,
where yi,t is search activity of subject i in period t, pvi,t is the market value of
subject i’s portfolio at the end of period t, and ∆xt = xt − xt−1. Xi,t is a set
of control variables that include a time trend and the personal characteristics
of subject i. A time trend is included to allow for the fact that subjects may
tend to naturally decrease their search activity over time, for example due to
learning effects. Search activity is proxied by the total time spent looking at
the screen.
Estimates (see appendix) of the parameters of this regression are sugges-
tive. First, as expected, the coefficient on the time trend is negative and highly
significant. This means that subjects do have a tendency to decrease their
screen attention over time. Secondly, the coefficients on the subject character-
istics are all insignificant, suggesting that patterns of changes are not related
to socio-economic variables. Finally, the estimate of γ is positive, but insignif-
icant (p > 0.5). Thus search activity is not related to recent changes in portfolio
value, suggesting that subjects do not engage in more search after observing
large swings in their portfolio value. This is summarized as Result 5.4.
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Table 5.5: Screen focus and subject characteristics
Area of interest
Variable buy sell inv plis pgr dact dexp
Gender (Female)
Male 46.0 -71.3 5.7 13.5* -16.5 -36.6** 1.7
(64.0) (56.1) (15.3) (7.2) (25.1) (14.4) (14.9)
Ethnicity (North American)
Dutch 101.7 41.9 -35.0 3.2 -9.8 24.9 13.4
(98.9) (86.8) (23.7) (11.1) (38.8) (22.2) (23.0)
Other -33.3 -78.5 0.4 1.1 39.3 20.0 -26.8
European (92.4) (81.1) (22.1) (10.3) (36.3) (20.8) (21.5)
South -201.5 -66.2 45.1 -18.5 -31.3 36.2 56.5
American (168.0) (147.5) (40.2) (18.8) (66.0) (37.8) (39.1)
Other 121.9 208.8* 63.8* -2.9 -43.9 -15.5 93.6***
(130.9) (114.9) (31.3) (14.6) (51.4) (29.4) (30.5)
Major (Business)
Economics -92.1 -16.1 6.1 -2.2 -7.7 -41.9** 15.6
(68.3) (59.9) (16.3) (7.6) (26.8) (15.3) (15.9)
Other -27.9 2.2 27.3 -19.9 -39.3 -50.4 43.7
(99.2) (87.1) (23.7) (11.1) (39.0) (22.3) (23.1)
Years of education (1)
2 212.6** 63.1 39.4 17.0 37.0 23.2 27.3
(100.6) (88.3) (24.1) (11.3) (39.5) (22.6) (23.4)
3 2.5 -21.5 2.3 18.4 21.5 17.2 -26.8
(110.5) (97.0) (26.4) (12.4) (43.4) (24.9) (25.7)
4+ 132.5 93.2 6.0 7.8 25.5 36.6* 10.0
(94.1) (82.6) (22.5) (10.5) (37.0) (21.2) (21.9)
Experiment experience (No)
Yes -2.4 -119.6 -26.5 6.2 51.9 -66.1* -16.0
(142.7) (125.3) (34.1) (16.0) (56.0) (32.1) (33.2)
Trade experience (No)
Yes 7.2 108.5 28.9 -2.7 -28.4 3.4 16.6
(76.9) (67.5) (18.4) (8.6) (30.2) (17.3) (17.9)
Notes: Screen focus variables are the absolute length of time a subject spent looking
at a screen area. Fixed-effects regressions. Significance codes: 0 ’***’ 0.01 ’**’ 0.05 ’*’
0.1 ’ ’ 1. Standard errors in parentheses under coefficient estimates. Significance
tests are relative to the reference levels given in parentheses following the variable
names. N = 33.
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Result 5.4 Changes in search activity are not related to subject characteristics or
changes in portfolio value.
The investigation now turns away from explaining subject focus to consid-
ering its effect on market behavior.
5.3.4 Effects of subject focus
Consider how market performance in a particular period depends on previous
subject focus. Specifically, consider how observables in period t of a session
depend on average subject attention in period t− 1 of the same session. The
following result shows that short-term market behavior is strongly related to
screen focus.
Result 5.5 Attention to anything other than current dividends causes Bias to be rel-
atively smaller in the future. More attention to current dividends causes larger sub-
sequent price increases.
Support for Result 5.5 Consider a regression of the form:
yt = α + ∑
i
βi · aoii,t−1 + εt,
where yt is a measure of interest in period t of a session, and aoii,t−1 is the
percentage of time subjects spent looking at area of interest i in the period t−
1. The β coefficients measure the effect of screen focus on the subsequent value
of the measure yt. Specifically, βi measures how much larger the measure of
interest would have been if subjects had on average spent 1% more of their
time looking at focus area i. The session subscript has been omitted for reasons
of clarity. The results are reported in Table 5.6.
The first column shows that focusing on anything other than actual dividends
(the reference level for the regression) relatively decreases the size of future
biases. Conversely, focusing on realized dividends increases future biases in
prices. This suggests that a preoccupation with current dividends may spur
the formation of bubbles. The results of a similar regression on the number of
transactions in a period (column 3) are less statistically significant, however
still support the pattern observed with respect to bias. High volume is most
strongly preceded by attention to current dividends, suggesting that looking
at current dividends may drive demand up, increasing both prices and the
amount of trade in a period. Additionally, allowing for the size of previous
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Table 5.6: Regressions of period focus on percentage change in bias
and volume
Variable biast volt %∆biast+1 %∆volt+1
buyt−1 15.4 -106.4 -7.8 -10.3 -45.7*** -35.8 -5.2 -6.8
(213.9) (280.8) (14.9) (19.1) (16.0) (20.5) (3.7) (5.3)
sellt−1 38.9 -357.3 -8.7 -18.3 -35.0** -28.4 -4.8 -7.2
(214.4) (277.4) (15.0) (18.8) (16.0) (20.4) (3.8) (5.2)
invt−1 42.1 -562.4 -34.1** -63.4 -36.3* -16.9 -10.4** -16.5**
(288.6) (402.6) (20.3) (27.6) (21.2) (29.1) (5.2) (7.5)
plist−1 309.5 412.3 -3.0 -8.0 -43.6** -20.1 -3.1 -6.1
(288.4) (386.0) (20.3) (26.7) (21.4) (27.9) (5.1) (7.2)
pgrt−1 383.7 -72.8 8.6 -8.9 -31.9 -28.5 -1.0 -6.6
(298.9) (416.7) (20.8) (28.0) (21.9) (30.4) (5.2) (7.7)
dexpt−1 347.3 833.7 -3.6 -2.8 -55.8 -48.4 -7.6 -16.5
(475.2) (694.8) (33.8) (48.3) (34.5) (49.1) (8.4) (12.9)
dt−1 -0.3 0.02 -0.01 -0.0
(0.3) (0.02) (0.02) (0.0)
dt−2 -7.4 -0.24 0.37 -0.0
(9.4) (0.61) (0.67) (0.2)
dt−2× 3.8 0.04 -0.24 -0.0
buyt−1 (9.8) (0.62) (0.70) (0.2)
dt−2× 12.5 0.32 -0.40 0.0
sellt−1 (9.7) (0.64) (0.69) (0.2)
dt−2× 23.8* 0.98 -0.64 -0.0
invt−1 (13.4) (0.90) (0.94) (0.2)
dt−2× -6.5 0.05 -0.61 0.1
plist−1 (13.0) (0.88) (0.93) (0.2)
dt−2× 16.4 0.87 -0.36 0.2
pgrt−1 (13.6) (0.85) (0.96) (0.2)
dt−2× -31.7 -0.91 -0.03 0.2
dexpt−1 (25.5) (1.73) (1.82) (0.5)
N 119 110 123 114 112 104 119 110
Notes: Fixed-effects regressions. Significance codes: 0 ’***’ 0.01 ’**’ 0.05 ’*’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1. Standard
errors in parentheses under coefficient estimates. Significance tests are relative to the effect of
adivt−1.
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dividends (reported columns 2 and 4) does not change the main findings. Div-
idend size in the period preceding the recording of subject focus reduces the
differential impact between looking at dividends and the rest of the screen,
although this effect is quite mild.
A specific type of price change in bubble markets is the crash that occurs
when the bubble implodes. The previous result suggests that these crashes are
preceded by shifts in attention away from realized dividends to other parts of
the screen. Analysis of the three sessions that experience large price crashes
leads to the following observation:
Observation 4 Crashes are immediately preceded by an absolute decline in atten-
tion to purchasing opportunities, while during the early stages of a crash attention
immediately returns to the purchasing area at the expense of the selling area.
The data underlying this observation are presented in Table 5.7. It shows
for each of the sessions that experienced a large crash, the size of the subse-
quent crash (measured as the average percentage decrease in price per period
remaining in the market), along with changes in the level (first rows) and pro-
portion of attention (second rows) accorded to each area of the screen.
Consider, for example, Session 2 (column 2). Just before the crash (peri-
ods 6 & 7), subjects on average decreased the amount of attention they paid
to the purchasing section of the screen by 7.4 seconds (or almost 5%). Dur-
ing the crash which began in period 8, subjects increased their attention to the
purchasing area by 16 seconds (or about 8%) while decreasing their attention
to the selling area by almost the same amount (10.6 seconds, or 7.4%). This
pattern holds for all three crashes, thus it appears to be a general pattern that
impending crashes are foreshadowed by a sharp drop in attention to the buy-
ing section of the screen, whereas once the crash has started attention shifts
back to the purchasing area (mostly at the expense of the selling area).
This combination of findings is suggestive of how experience with divi-
dends might play a role in determining bubble sizes. Specifically, subjects
may simply be unfamiliar with dividends and thus extropolate higher earn-
ings in the future from the dividends they currently receive. The graphical
presentation of dividend information does not by itself help subjects establish
accurate beliefs about expected dividends. This would explain why in settings
where subjects have experience with receiving real dividends, bubbles tend to
decrease in size (such as in Lei and Vesely (2009), where subjects have a spe-
cial training phase for dividends, and such as in Noussair and Powell (2010),
where subjects participate in repeated markets).
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Table 5.7: Subject focus before and during crashes
Session S2 S7 S9 Mean
Size 10% 19% 11% 13%
t t∗ − 1 t∗ t∗ − 1 t∗ t∗ − 1 t∗ t∗ − 1 t∗
∆buyt -7.4 16.08 -28.43 25.46 -14.98 12.71 -16.94 18.09
% -0.05 0.08 -0.13 0.15 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.08
∆sellt 11.03 -10.65 5.37 -13.16 34.73 -8.76 17.04 -10.85
% 0.08 -0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.15 -0.04 0.08 -0.04
∆invt 1.32 0.98 5.81 -1.24 -7.95 10.79 -0.27 3.51
% 0.01 0 0.03 0 -0.05 0.02 0 0.01
∆plist -1.51 0.56 4.75 -4.6 1.44 1.89 1.56 -0.72
% -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
∆pgrt 2.49 3.9 12 -14.05 -5.54 -7.61 2.98 -5.92
% 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02
∆dexpt -5.38 -3.79 6.04 -11.21 -2.69 5.4 -0.68 -3.2
% -0.01 0 0.02 -0.01 0 0 0 0
∆dactt -2.13 -2.75 -3.25 -5.5 -6 5.95 -3.8 -0.77
% -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
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Table 5.8: Effect of subject attention on change in share holdings rela-
tive to actual dividends
Area of Interest
buyt−1 sellt−1 invt−1 plist−1 pgrt−1 dexpt−1
Estimate -2.12*** -1.17* -4.23*** -2.44** -0.81 -4.03
(0.55) (0.66) (1.57) (1.18) (1.11) (4.09)
Notes: Fixed-effects regression. Dependant variable is ∆st. Significance
codes: 0 ’***’ 0.01 ’**’ 0.05 ’*’ 0.1 ’ ’ 1. Standard errors in parentheses under
coefficient estimates. Significance tests are relative to estimate of dactt−1. N =
72.
Having established that screen focus is an important predictor of certain
market outcomes, this section considers whether screen focus can predict in-
dividual behavior as well. Here the analysis is restricted to the context of
subject optimism. In particular, does subject focus predict whether or not a
subject will accumulate shares in the near future?
Result 5.6 Subject holdings increase most when subjects have been looking at re-
ceived dividends. They decrease most following attention to inventory.
Support for Result 5.6 Table 5.8 shows how changes in subject holdings, st,
are related to how a subject divided up their attention in the previous period
of the market. Subjects who spent more time looking at actual dividends (the
reference level) were the most likely to increase their share holdings. On the
other hand, it appears that share offloading was most likely to be preceded
by subjects spending time looking at their inventory. Therefore it appears that
changes in share holdings are most directly driven by concern for a subject’s
own earnings and inventory. They do not appear to be caused by a strategy
that relies on predicting future price changes on the basis of the order book,
which would have involved the buy or sell areas of interest, or previous trade
prices, which would have used the pricing screen areas.
The previous findings suggest that subject behavior depends on which types
of information subjects choose to absorb. One question that follows naturally
from this is whether different subjects look at different information because
they follow distinct trading strategies.
De Long et al. (1990) propose three types of traders populating a market:
fundamentalists, momentum traders, and hyper-rational forecasters. The ta-
ble below summarizes the information which each trader type uses when
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Table 5.9: Signals for Trader Types
Type Signal
Fundamentals traders, FV −biast−1
Rational speculators, RA ∆biast+1
Momentum traders, MM ∆biast−1
Notes: The sign of the change in share
holdings, ∆sit, is the same as the signal sign.
determining whether to increase or decrease their share holdings over time.
This information is called the trader’s signal, where positive signals mean the
trader will increase their share holdings, and negative signals mean the trader
will be a net seller of shares in the current period. All signals are defined in
terms of the period bias.
Table 5.9 shows how each trader type behaves. Fundamental value traders
(FV) increase their share holdings when shares are currently under-priced. Ra-
tional speculators (RA) correctly anticipate the next period’s price movement
and buy shares in the current period if shares will become more over-priced in
the next period. Finally, momentum traders (MM) increase share holdings if
bias has been increasing in the recent past. When the conditions for increasing
share holdings are not met, share holdings are decreased (or held constant if a
signal of zero is received).
Given these theoretical benchmarks, actual traders are classified accord-
ing to the following rules, adapted from Haruvy et al. (2010) 3. A score for
each period is assigned to each trader based on how strongly their behavior
coincides with how each theoretical trader type would have behaved in that
period. Then the cumulative period scores are used to give a final measure of
the extent to which a subject acted as each of the trader types.
The classification relies on the proportion of subject i’s wealth that is held in
stocks versus cash in period t, referred to as portfolio position, ppi,t. Formally,
ppi,t = si,t/smaxi,t ,
where si,t and smaxi,t are the actual and maximum share holdings of subject i at
the end of period t (where the maximum share holdings are determined using
3This classification differs from the previous one in a few ways: first, period scores are
weighted according to the magnitude with which a subject behaved like a trader type, and
also according to the strength of the signal received; second, subjects are not uniquely classi-
fied as one type of trader or another; finally, signals depend on bias, and not solely price.
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cash holdings ci,t and the median transaction price pt, so that smaxi,t = si,t +
ci,t/pt). Taking into consideration that relative portfolio positions naturally
tend to decrease as dividends are injected into the market, these positions are
always considered relative to the average portfolio position of all subjects in
the market.
For each period t, a trader is given a score for each type depending on the
change in the subject’s relative portfolio position between the beginning and
end of the period, ∆t pp = ppt − ppt−1. This difference is used in conjunction
with the force of the signals that each type of trader would have received in a
period to calculate scores for each trader type in each period. Specifically,
scoret = ∆t pp/signalt,
where scoret is the subject’s score for period t, signalt is the signal during that
period (see Table 5.9).
Recall that different types of information are required to follow different
types of trading strategies. In particular, fundamentalists require information
about current prices and current fundamentals, whereas momentum traders
look back in time to previous prices and previous fundamentals to make their
portfolio decisions. This provides a clear hypothesis in terms of screen focus:
the more strongly a subject follows one of the three trading strategies, the
more time they should spend looking at the information that is relevant for
that trading strategy.
In terms of the specific interface used in this experiment, this means that
momentum traders, who are the only ones who trade on the basis of historical
information, should spend the most time looking at the price graph and the
graph of fundamentals, since these are the only sources of historical informa-
tion regarding previous periods. Similarly, fundamental traders, who trade
only on the basis of current price and fundamentals information, should be
most likely to focus their attention on current transaction prices, given in the
price list, and current fundamentals, given most explicitly in the area concern-
ing actual dividends. Thus the theory clearly predicts different focal areas of
interest for these two different types of traders.
The relationship between how strongly subjects followed each trading strat-
egy and the relative amount of attention paid to each types focal point of in-
terest is given in Figure 5.3. The panels present relative attention to the focal
area on the horizontal axis and classification scores on the vertical axis. To the
extent that the description above is true, the more highly a trader is scored as a
particular type, the more time they should have spent looking at the focal area
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for their type. This turns out to be the case for Momentum types (first panel).
As a subject pays higher levels of attention to the information that momentum
traders are associated with, a subject is more and more likely to be classified
as a momentum type than a fundamentalist. For attention to fundamentalist
information, this is also the case. The more attention is paid to current period
information that fundamentalists are assocated with, the more likely a subject
is to be classified as a fundamentalist.

































Given the relatively small number of observations, it is not surprising that
these findings are not statistically significant. However it does appear that
there is at least some support for the 3-trader classification scheme. On the ba-
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sis of this study, it appears that given the information that subjects have cho-
sen to seek out from the trading screen, they subsequently behave in the ways
predicted by the model. This provides another piece of evidence suggesting
that the trading models may provide fruitful insights in future research.
5.4 Conclusion
This study explores how outcomes in laboratory asset markets are related to
the information that subjects visually collect from their environment. Several
different aspects of the setting are examined, in the hopes of providing initial
observations that may provide useful for future research undertakings.
In the context of experimental design, the addition of graphical elements is
found to not have a strong effect on outcomes. While a significant amount of
attention is paid to the graphical sections of the display containing dividend
information, this information is found to not have a profound effect on price
efficiency. This suggests that the sensitivity of bubble formation to dividends
may not be because subjects find the raw information about dividends diffi-
cult to digest. It could simply be that initially subjects do not fully understand
the content of dividend information and how it affects their earnings. This
would explain why bubbles are not eliminated in the setting studied here, but
can be eliminated when subjects receive real dividends, as they do when mar-
ket settings are repeated, or in training phases such as that of Lei and Vesely
(2009).
The results from the market analysis also support such an interpretation.
Price increases tend to be preceded by extra attention being paid to the sec-
tion of the screen where the most recently received dividends are displayed.
This suggests, although does not prove, that bubbles may be instigated by
increases in individual expectations regarding future dividends, and not on
the basis of gains expected from buying low and selling in the future at a
high price. This stands in contrast to the description of a bubble put forward
by Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), who suggests that bubbles are driven by
capital gains expectations. Additionally, crash episodes are found to be most
prominently precipiated by shifts away from and back towards the purchas-
ing area of the screen.
Individual subject behavior reveals several interesting patterns. First, infor-
mation selection by subjects is not very sensitive to personal characteristics.
Ethnicity, years of education, and experience in similar experimental settings
to not have a strong effect on where subjects focus their attention. The only
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mildly influential variables appear to be gender and choice of major, although
neither is as strong as would be expected given findings in other financial set-
tings. Secondly, large changes in share holdings appear to be preceded by
extra attention to inventory and dividend areas of the screen, as opposed to
areas of the screen containing transaction information. This also suggests that
subjects trade without a motive to capitalize on price changes; instead they are
focused on the direct accumulation of dividends. Finally, this study provides
some support for a three-type classification of traders. Traders tend to behave
in ways consistent with what the model predicts they would do, given their
distribution of attention to the screen.
Perhaps most importantly, this work provides an example of how eye-
tracking methods may be applied to asset market research. As the quote at
the beginning of the paper makes clear, taking vision directly into account
may allow for many types of analyses that have previously been hidden from
the research agenda.
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5.A Appendix
The TOBII EYE TRACKER IS eye-tracking machines were calibrated using
the default settings recommended for a combination of images and text (see
Table 5.10) for Clearview 2.7. The system records the duration, time-stamp
and screen coordinates of subjects’ screen fixations every 3 milliseconds. Pupil
dilation data is also collected. More information is available from the Tobii
website: www.tobii.com.
Table 5.11 contains a summary of the experimental data for all sessions of
the study. This is followed by the subject instructions, the text of the question-
naire, and a listing of additional regression results.





Screen resolution: 1024 x 768
Screen size: 19”
Table 5.11: Session Information
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
# of subjects 9 9 8 9 9 7 9 9 8
Bias -184.5 -47.5 2636.0 69.5 197.0 -1187.0 1045.0 -442.5 437.5
buy 0.29 0.34 0.48 0.46 0.38 0.39 0.47 0.41 0.35
sell 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11
inv 0.40 0.36 0.25 0.34 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.34
pgr 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.07
plis 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
dexp 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.05
dact 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07
Due to technical difficulties, two eye-tracking subjects were not recorded. Due to attendance




This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might
earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you at the end of
the experiment. The experiment consists of a sequence of trading Periods in
which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The goods
that can be bought and sold in the market are called Shares. The currency used
in the market is francs. The cash payment to you at the end of the experiment
will be in euros. The conversion rate is: 400 francs to 1 euro.
The experiment is organized as follows. First, everyone reads these instruc-
tions and participates in a practice period. Following the practice period, more
instructions will be given, and then the real market will begin. Your earnings
only depend on your actions in the real market. It will be made very clear
when the real market begins.
2. How to use the computerized market
Trading is conducted by making offers to buy and sell shares for francs. The
screen is divided into 5 parts (see picture).
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PART 1: INVENTORY The number of Shares and Money you currently have.
PART 2: BUYING Here you can "Offer to buy" a share, or "Buy" a share directly
from someone who has offered to sell a share. When you buy a share, your
Money decreases by the price of the purchase.
To make an offer to buy, enter the price at which you are offering to buy a
share, and then click the "Offer to buy" button. Your offer will now appear
under "Offers to Buy" in the bottom-left of the screen (part 3).
To buy a share directly, click on an offer from the "Offers to Sell" list, then press
"Buy". You will then buy one share for the currently selected price.
PART 3: SELLING Here you can "Offer to sell" a share, or "Sell" a share directly
to someone who has offered to buy a share. When you sell a share your Money
increases by the price of the sale.
To make an offer to sell, enter the price at which you are offering to sell a
share, and then click the "Offer to sell" button. Your offer will now appear
under "Offers to Sell" in the top-left of the screen (part 2).
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To sell a share directly, click on an offer from the "Offers to Buy" list, then press
"Sell". You will then sell one share for the currently selected price.
Your offers are always listed in blue. Submitting a second offer will replace
your previous offer. If you have an offer selected and the offer gets changed,
it will become deselected if the offer became worse for you. If the offer gets
better, it will remain selected. It is not possible to borrow money or shares.
PART 4: PRICES & TIME The prices at which Shares have been bought and
sold in the market. Squares indicate trades. The moving red bar indicates the
time left in the market.
PART 5: The bottom-right area of the screen will be explained later.
3. Practice Period
You will now have about 10 minutes to buy and sell shares in a practice period.
Your actions in the practice period do not count toward your earnings and
do not influence your position later in the experiment. The only goal of the
practice period is to master the use of the interface. Please be sure that you
have made offers to buy and offers to sell. Also be sure that you have accepted
buy and sell offers.
If at any time you have any questions or concerns, the experimenter will come
by and assist you.
4. Specific Instructions for this experiment
The experiment will consist of 15 trading periods, denoted by gray bars on
the graphs. In each period, there will be a market open for 2 minutes in which
you may buy and sell shares. Shares are assets with a life of 15 periods. Your
inventory of shares and money carries over from one trading period to the
next. You may receive dividends for each share in your inventory at the end
of each of the 15 trading periods.
At the end of each trading period, including period 15, the computer will
randomly determine the dividend value for all shares in that period. Each
period, each share you hold at the end of the period:
earns you a dividend of 0 francs with probability 1/4
earns you a dividend of 8 francs with probability 1/4
earns you a dividend of 28 francs with probability 1/4
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earns you a dividend of 60 francs with probability 1/4
Each of the four dividend values is equally likely, thus the average dividend
in each period is 24. Dividends are added immediately to your cash balance
when they are received. After the dividend is paid at the end of period 15,
there will be no further earnings possible from shares.
PART 5: AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE
The last part of the screen indicates information related to dividends. There
are 4 amounts listed. The first, “Previous dividend”, is the amount of the
last dividend, if any, you received on your shares. The next is the “Number
of remaining dividends” for a share. The third amount is the “Average divi-
dend” in each period, and is always 24 francs. The final value, the “AVERAGE
HOLDING VALUE”, is the average amount of dividends you will receive for
holding a share in your inventory from the current period until the end of the
experiment.
Suppose for example that it is Period 14. Then there are 2 trading periods
remaining in the market, and also 2 dividends remaining on a share. Since
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the average dividend on a Share is 24, if you hold a Share for the remaining 2
periods, the total dividends for the Share over the 2 periods will on average be
2*24 = 48. Therefore, the average value of holding a Share over the 2 periods
is 48 francs.
The graph shows the average holding value over all 15 periods.
5. Your Earnings
Your earnings for the entire experiment will equal the amount of cash that
you have at the end of period 15, after the last dividend has been paid. The
amount of cash you will have is equal to:
The cash (called “Money” on your screen) you have at the beginning of the
experiment
+ dividends you receive
+ money received from sales of shares




2. Ethnicity you most associate with:
[Dutch / Other European / Asian / African / North American / South Amer-
ican / Other]
3. Area of study:
[Business / Economics / Other]
4. Years of university study:
[1 / 2 / 3 / 4+]
5. Have you previously participated in economics experiments?:
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[Yes / No]
6. Have you previously participated in economics trading experiments?:
[Yes / No]
Additional Regression Results
This section includes results on aggregate subject behavior as a function of
subject characteristics and whether or not they used an eye-tracking device.
> subjects$y = subjects$Earnings
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = fm, data = curData, model = "within", index = c("Session",
"Subject"))
Unbalanced Panel: n=9, T=7-9, N=77
Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
-2710.0 -679.0 63.3 633.0 4380.0
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
eyeTrTRUE -114.796 341.999 -0.3357 0.73713
qst_genderMale -417.201 361.115 -1.1553 0.24796
qst_ethniDutch 983.280 497.199 1.9776 0.04797 *
qst_ethniOther 98.016 817.493 0.1199 0.90456
qst_ethniOther European 675.137 576.609 1.1709 0.24165
qst_ethniSouth American -186.840 1062.035 -0.1759 0.86035
qst_majorEconomics 13.753 374.320 0.0367 0.97069
qst_majorOther -354.839 556.549 -0.6376 0.52375
qst_yrs2 612.887 542.598 1.1295 0.25867
qst_yrs3 263.359 575.973 0.4572 0.64750
qst_yrs4+ 539.307 491.198 1.0979 0.27223
qst_expYes -539.634 582.195 -0.9269 0.35398
qst_tradYes 671.235 398.435 1.6847 0.09205 .
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---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 119310000
Residual Sum of Squares: 95368000
F-statistic: 1.06203 on 13 and 55 DF, p-value: 0.40987
>
> subjects$y = subjects$numTrades
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = fm, data = curData, model = "within", index = c("Session",
"Subject"))
Unbalanced Panel: n=9, T=7-9, N=77
Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
-97.60 -21.20 -3.92 17.10 205.00
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
eyeTrTRUE -6.28071 12.54645 -0.5006 0.61666
qst_genderMale 5.63275 13.24775 0.4252 0.67070
qst_ethniDutch 29.60845 18.24009 1.6233 0.10453
qst_ethniOther -13.53260 29.99027 -0.4512 0.65182
qst_ethniOther European 8.54054 21.15328 0.4037 0.68640
qst_ethniSouth American 29.52053 38.96147 0.7577 0.44864
qst_majorEconomics -0.28363 13.73219 -0.0207 0.98352
qst_majorOther 1.38550 20.41738 0.0679 0.94590
qst_yrs2 -31.93532 19.90556 -1.6043 0.10864
qst_yrs3 -36.41568 21.12997 -1.7234 0.08481 .
qst_yrs4+ -44.56323 18.01993 -2.4730 0.01340 *
qst_expYes -18.16222 21.35820 -0.8504 0.39512
qst_tradYes -16.21959 14.61686 -1.1096 0.26715
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
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Total Sum of Squares: 168930
Residual Sum of Squares: 128350
F-statistic: 1.33772 on 13 and 55 DF, p-value: 0.22041
>
> subjects$y = subjects$numOffers
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = fm, data = curData, model = "within", index = c("Session",
"Subject"))
Unbalanced Panel: n=9, T=7-9, N=77
Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
-119.00 -32.40 -3.17 24.60 221.00
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
eyeTrTRUE -8.35734 16.18221 -0.5165 0.60554
qst_genderMale 12.51123 17.08673 0.7322 0.46403
qst_ethniDutch 42.50720 23.52577 1.8068 0.07079 .
qst_ethniOther -26.85173 38.68096 -0.6942 0.48757
qst_ethniOther European 18.90398 27.28315 0.6929 0.48838
qst_ethniSouth American 37.03183 50.25186 0.7369 0.46117
qst_majorEconomics -11.12995 17.71155 -0.6284 0.52974
qst_majorOther 0.73823 26.33401 0.0280 0.97764
qst_yrs2 -26.30993 25.67386 -1.0248 0.30547
qst_yrs3 -38.38069 27.25309 -1.4083 0.15904
qst_yrs4+ -44.21637 23.24181 -1.9024 0.05711 .
qst_expYes -32.00830 27.54746 -1.1619 0.24526
qst_tradYes -14.51886 18.85259 -0.7701 0.44123
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 277230
Residual Sum of Squares: 213510
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F-statistic: 1.26246 on 13 and 55 DF, p-value: 0.26360
>
> subjects$y = subjects$avgStock
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
Call:
plm(formula = fm, data = curData, model = "within", index = c("Session",
"Subject"))
Unbalanced Panel: n=9, T=7-9, N=77
Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
-6.000 -1.800 -0.506 0.976 14.000
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
eyeTrTRUE 0.055083 0.909797 0.0605 0.9517
qst_genderMale 0.855953 0.960652 0.8910 0.3729
qst_ethniDutch -0.156972 1.322668 -0.1187 0.9055
qst_ethniOther -0.194352 2.174724 -0.0894 0.9288
qst_ethniOther European 2.109785 1.533915 1.3754 0.1690
qst_ethniSouth American 2.256488 2.825264 0.7987 0.4245
qst_majorEconomics -0.021113 0.995780 -0.0212 0.9831
qst_majorOther 1.303988 1.480553 0.8807 0.3785
qst_yrs2 -0.548683 1.443438 -0.3801 0.7039
qst_yrs3 0.917282 1.532225 0.5987 0.5494
qst_yrs4+ 0.293509 1.306703 0.2246 0.8223
qst_expYes 0.591204 1.548775 0.3817 0.7027
qst_tradYes 0.081110 1.059932 0.0765 0.9390
Total Sum of Squares: 746.1
Residual Sum of Squares: 674.9
F-statistic: 0.446318 on 13 and 55 DF, p-value: 0.94425
>
> subjects$y = subjects$avgMoney
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
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Call:
plm(formula = fm, data = curData, model = "within", index = c("Session",
"Subject"))
Unbalanced Panel: n=9, T=7-9, N=77
Residuals :
Min. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu. Max.
-1550.0 -455.0 -35.6 443.0 2850.0
Coefficients :
Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)
eyeTrTRUE -70.652 223.758 -0.3158 0.75219
qst_genderMale -330.474 236.266 -1.3987 0.16189
qst_ethniDutch 423.762 325.301 1.3027 0.19269
qst_ethniOther -223.053 534.858 -0.4170 0.67666
qst_ethniOther European 167.595 377.256 0.4442 0.65686
qst_ethniSouth American -609.163 694.854 -0.8767 0.38066
qst_majorEconomics -89.111 244.905 -0.3639 0.71596
qst_majorOther -637.928 364.132 -1.7519 0.07979 .
qst_yrs2 445.951 355.004 1.2562 0.20905
qst_yrs3 98.620 376.840 0.2617 0.79355
qst_yrs4+ 400.058 321.375 1.2448 0.21319
qst_expYes -444.144 380.911 -1.1660 0.24361
qst_tradYes 236.453 260.683 0.9071 0.36438
---
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Total Sum of Squares: 49516000
Residual Sum of Squares: 40824000
F-statistic: 0.900866 on 13 and 55 DF, p-value: 0.55737
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY)
Markten vervullen ten minste drie belangrijke functies in de economie. Ten
eerste, markten staan handel toe. Goederen en diensten kunnen worden herverdeeld
naar diegenen die hen het hoogst waarderen. Ten tweede, markten zorgen er
voor dat risico’s worden samengevoegd en worden verminderd. Een degeli-
jke diversificatie vermindert de hoeveelheid risico die individuen lopen. Ten
derde, markten kunnen informatie aggregeren. Het is deze derde functie van
markten die het onderwerp vormt van dit proefschrift.
Door hun transactieprijzen hebben markten het potentieel om diverse in-
formatie te aggregeren en om signalen af te geven aan agenten over relatieve,
fundamentele, waarde van verschillende goederen en diensten. De taak van het
evalueren van relatieve waardes van de hoeveelheid goederen geproduceerd
door de maatschappij lijkt een immense taak, toch zorgen competitieve mark-
ten (tenminste in de theorie) voor een oplossing voor dit probleem, in een
onbedoelde vorm van “crowd-sourcing”. Dit proces wordt prijsontdekking ge-
noemd. Relatief hoge prijzen, bijvoorbeeld, verzenden een signaal dat een
bepaald goed erg waardevol is voor een maatschappij – agenten hebben dan
een prikkel om het aanbod (de productie) van dat goed te verhogen, ter-
wijl op hetzelfde moment de vraag naar het goed afneemt (als consumptie
en/of als input voor productie). Op deze manier kunnen prijzen fungeren
als maatschappelijke gids die vertelt hoe te consumeren en hoe productieve
hulpbronnen te verdelen. Als prijsontdekking heeft plaatsgevonden, wordt
gezegd dat markten efficiënt zijn.
Echter, het probleem is dat er geen garantie is dat markt prijzen precies
alle individuele preferenties zullen aggregeren, op die manier dat de relatieve
prijzen correct de fundamentele waarde reflecteren. Sterker nog, er is geen
garantie dat relatieve prijzen bij benadering alle individuele preferenties ag-
gregeren. Als prijzen verschillen van de fundamentele waardes, wordt gezegd
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dat er sprake is van misprijzing op de markt. Een patroon waarin prijzen kun-
nen afwijken van de fundamentele waardes is een luchtbel. In goederenmark-
ten is een luchtbel een periode van continue groeiende overprijzing, beëindigd
door middel van een scherpe daling, of crash van prijzen richting de funda-
mentele waarde. Als fundamentele waares relatief stabiel zijn gedurende deze
periode, dan groeien prijzen tot een dag waarop ze spectaculair ineenstorten.
Deze evenementen zorgen vaak voor chaos in hun kielzog. Degenen die
zich onbewust zijn van een crash, ervaren significante verliezen die vaak lei-
den tot effecten in andere delen van de economie. De directe kosten van een
luchtbel worden gevormd door de overinvesteringen die het gevolg zijn van
de tijdelijke overprijzing van een goed. De indirecte kosten van een luchtbel
zijn de gevolgen van de kenmerkend grote en snelle herdistributie van vermo-
gen dat zich voordoet als prijzen ineenstorten aan het einde van een luchtbel.
Deze grote fluctuaties in vermogen kunnen leiden tot sociale onrust en kun-
nen overvloeien naar de rest van de economie.
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie experimentele studies die verschillende as-
pecten van een luchtbel bekijken. Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat het tijdspad dat
fundamentele waardes volgen de efficiëntie van markten beïnvloedt. De notie
dat fundamentele waardes prijzen beïnvloeden wordt over het algemeen als
waar aangenomen, maar het vernieuwende aan dit hoofdstuk is dat het laat
zien dat omkeerpunten in fundamentele waardes ook efficiëntie kunnen beïn-
vloeden. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat markten efficiënter presteren gedurende
een neerwaartse gang van fundamentele waardes dan in het geval van een op-
waartse gang. De implicaties van deze asymmetrie is dat het misschien nodig
is dat beleid ook asymmetrisch is.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert de creatie en destructie van financiële aandelen
van bedrijven door middel van het gebruik van aandeeluitgiften en het her-
aankopen van aandelen. De resultaten laten zien dat het heraankopen van
aandelen zorgt voor een toename van de prijs van het goed, en dat een aan-
deel uitgifte zorgt voor een afname van de prijs van het goed, vergeleken met
een scenario waarin geen interventie plaats vindt. Deze effecten zijn consis-
tent met de kapitaalstructuurpuzzle, een negatieve correlatie die kenmerkend
is voor de prijs en het aanbod van aandelen. Ten tweede, het empirische pa-
troon dat wordt geobserveerd is consistent met een model van drie hande-
laars typen – fundamental, speculator en momentum – die een wisselwerking
hebben in de markt. Tot slot, de neerwaartse druk op prijzen als gevolg van
aandeeluitgiften drijven de prijzen naar beneden in de richting van, maar niet
tot aan, de fundamentele waardes. Deze neerwaartse wrijving op de funda-
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mentele waarde komt door de impact van een interventie op het deel van de
totale voorraad aan eenheden en geld die door ieder handelaarstype wordt
vastgehouden.
Hoofdstuk 5 is een studie naar het gebruik van informatie in een luchtbel-
markt en de relatie tot navolgend keuzegedrag. Gebruik makend van tech-
nieken die oogbewegingen volgen, wordt een experiment uitgevoerd die in-
gaat op hoe individuen die handelen op een markt zich focussen op het scherm
waar het experiment op wordt uitgevoerd. Ten opzichte van overwegingen
omtrent het experimenteel ontwerp, is er bewijs dat slechts enkele typen van
dividendinformatie de prijsontdekking beïnvloeden. Om de data van de oog-
patronen te verklaren, wordt het verkrijgen van informatie als stabiel bevon-
den over een verscheidenheid aan socio-demografische maatstaven. Het laat-
ste stuk van de analyse gebruikt de data van de oogpatronen om korte termijn
gedrag van individuen en markten te voorspellen. Aandacht voor ontvan-
gen dividenden speelt een prominente rol, zowel in termen van toekomstige
prijs toenames, als in termen van individuele handelspatronen. Markt crashes
worden voorgegaan door een sterke daling in aandacht voor koopkansen,
terwijl wanneer een crash onderweg is, aandacht neigt terug te keren naar
het aankoopgedeelte van een scherm. De recente convulsies in het globale
economische systeem hebben laten zien dat er sterke zorgen zijn ten aanzien
van de mogelijkheid van het marktsysteem om “de zaken voor elkaar te hebben”.
Dit proefschrift is een kleine stap voorwaarts in de richting van het beter be-
grijpen van dat systeem en het verbeteren van de prestaties.

